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LOCAL FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Carl Tobias*
Federal civil procedure is now byzantine. Lawyers and parties
face, and federal judges apply, a bewildering panorama of requirements. There are strictures in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
well as Tide 28 of the United States Code and dozens of substantive
statutes. A stunning array of local measures-including local rules;
general, special, and scheduling orders; individual-judge practices;
and mechanisms that courts adopted under the Civil Justice Reform
Act (CJRA) of 1990 to reduce cost and delay-also govern cases in all
ninety-four districts. Many of the provisions' are inconsistent or duplicative, while a significant percentage are difficult to discover, master,
and satisfy. These phenomena have apparently undermined the federal rules' core precepts, such as uniformity, simplicity, and economical, expeditious dispute resolution, and have eroded important
process values, namely court access. The developments mean that
federal practice is more fractured than at any time since the Supreme
Court prescribed the original federal rules during 1938.
This balkanization of federal civil procedure was not inevitable.
Indeed, over a decade ago, the Court and Congress instituted actions
to treat growing fragmentation, particularly the proliferation of conflicting local strictures. For example, the 1985 amendment in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and theJuaicial Improvements and Access
to Justice Act (JIA) of 1988 required that the Judicial Conference of
the United States, circuit judicial councils, federal appellate and district courts, and specific judges periodically review local procedures
for consistency with the federal rules and legislation and abrogate or
el

Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to thank Paul
Carrington, Dan Coquillette, David Pimentel, Lauren Robel, Peggy Sanner, Steve
Subrin, and MaryJo Wiggins for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte
Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust and Jim Rogers for
generous, continuing support. I was a member of the Ninth Circuit Local Rules
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errors that remain are mine.
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modify violative provisions. Few institutions or people have fulfilled
the responsibilities imposed principally because Congress appropriated no funding and adopted the CJRA, which essentially suspended
implementation of the duties. This truncated effectuation and experimentation with mechanisms under the 1990 statute, some of which
contravene the federal rules, United States Code provisions, and requirements in the remaining ninety-three districts, have led to increasingly fractured civil practice. Now that the date on which the CJRA
was scheduled to expire has passed and federal litigation has become
more arcane than ever, it is critical to analyze these developments in
contemporary civil disputing. This Article undertakes that effort.
The first Part traces the background of local procedural proliferation, which gradually expanded after the promulgation of the initial
federal rules and has accelerated since 1980. The exponential increase in local strictures, many of which were conflicting, prompted
Supreme Court revision of Rule 83 during 1985 and 1995, as well as
legislative enactment of the JIA in 1988. The Court and Congress
clearly intended to limit inconsistent and redundant local requirements which were complicating federal practice. The second Part
evaluates implementation of the mandates in Rule 83 and in the 1988
statute and ascertains that most entities and persons responsible for
discharging the obligations have not performed them. I then assess
the reasons for incomplete compliance, which were substantially attributable to resource deficiencies and to the 1990 CJRA's discontinued effectuation of the relevant commands in Rule 83 and the 1988
JIA, and analyze the consequences of limited implementation.
The third Part offers suggestions for the future. First, Congress
should definitely state that the CJRA has expired and that districts and
judges must abolish all conflicting and repetitive procedures adopted
under the statute. The institutions and individuals charged with effectuating the mandates related to local proliferation in Rule 83 and the
JIA should concomitantly reinvigorate and thoroughly implement
them. For instance, district courts and particular judges could eliminate existing, and refrain from the prescription of, new, local provisions which are inconsistent or redundant. The circuit councils might
concomitantly undertake comprehensive review of local strictures and
abrogate or change those found to conflict with or duplicate federal
rules or legislation. As the twenty-first century opens, these suggestions should restrict proliferation and the fragmentation of modem
federal court practice, promote the restoration of a uniform, simple
procedural regime, and decrease expense and delay in civil litigation.
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I.

A

ISTORY OF LOCAL PROCEDURAL PROLIFERATION

A.

Introduction

The growth of inconsistent and repetitive local requirements that
eventually fostered Supreme Court amendment of Rule 83 and congressional passage of the JIA, measures which were meant to limit
proliferation, warrant considerable evaluation in this Article, even
though these developments have been rather thoroughly chronicled
elsewhere. 1 Comparatively detailed examination can improve understanding of proliferation, why the commands imposed by the rule and
the statute received little effectuation, and how they might be revitalized and fully implemented.
I emphasize in this Part and throughout the Article proliferating
local civil procedures that federal district courts and judges have issued and applied, although many other provisions which cover local
practice in the federal courts are very important and deserve analysis
and treatment. For example, each United States court of appeals and
bankruptcy court has promulgated and enforced local strictures.
Practically all of the ninety-four districts and many judges have correspondingly prescribed and enforced local requirements that govern
criminal matters, and numerous courts and judges have adopted and
employed admiralty procedures. A plethora of provisions-variously
denominated as general, special, scheduling, and minute orders; internal operating procedures; and measures of specific judges, including standing orders and individual-judge practices, which may be
unwritten-also regulate federal court practice.
I focus on local district court civil procedures because there are
more of them, many of which are inconsistent or redundant, while the
problems that the strictures pose and their efficacious resolution can
felicitously serve as surrogates for the remaining local requirements.
Moreover, the systematic collection, analysis, and synthesis of all relevant local measures would be an overwhelming task. Nonetheless, in
an effort to facilitate future work, I catalog some of the provisions at
the conclusion of this Part; briefly assess implementation of the local
review mandates that Civil Rule 83's appellate, bankruptcy, and criminal analogues and theJIA imposed at the end of the second Part's first
Section; and afford suggestions for limiting proliferation of civil pro1 See, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, A CriticalReview of thw Local Rules of the United States
District Courtfor thw Southern District of California, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 557-64
(1996); Stephen N. Subrin, FederalRules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergene and EmergingProceduralPatterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2011-26 (1989).
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cedures, from which it should be rather easy to extrapolate for other
applicable local strictures in the third Part.
B.

The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

When Congress adopted the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,. it empowered the United States Supreme Court to prescribe procedures
that would cover civil litigation in every federal district court. 2 In
1935, the Supreme Court appointed the initial Advisory Committee
on the Civil Rules and requested that the Committee draft uniform
provisions which would govern practice in all federal districts. During
1942, the Court designated the surviving members of this entity as a
standing Advisory Committee, 3 and fourteen years thereafter, the
Court discharged that group. 4 In 1958, Congress assigned the responsibility for advising the Court to the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, which concomitantly named a permanent Advisory Committee. 5
The Advisory Committee, when drafting the original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Supreme Court promulgated during 1938, seemed to have in mind a number of purposes, although it
is difficult to divine the precise intent of the fourteen lawyers who
held varying views on the many issues which they explored. 6 However,
the attorneys apparently intended to ameliorate the complications
7
that common law and code procedure and practice had imposed.
More specifically, the Committee meant to rectify the exceedingly
technical nature of the earlier procedural schemes which strict plead2 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (1994); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1024 (1982); Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the
FederalRulemaking Process,44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1658 (1995); Carl Tobias, Public Law
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 272-77
(1989).
3. Order Continuing the Advisory Committee, 314 U.S. 720 (1942).
4 Order Discharging the Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956).
5 Act ofJuly 1, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331
(1994)).
6 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, ForJames Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of
the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975);Judith Resnik, FailingFaith:Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 498-99, 502-15 (1986); Tobias, supra note 2, at
272-77. I rely principally on secondary sources to offer an account that is most relevant to proliferation.
7 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914-21, 926-73 (1987);
Tobias, supra note 2, at 270, 272-73.
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ing typified.8 The drafters concomitantly hoped to reduce the difficulties resulting from the 1872 Conformity Act's mandate that federal
district judges apply procedures which resembled ihe strictures employed by the state courts of the jurisdictions where the federal courts
were located. 9
The federal rules seemingly incorporated numerous fundamental
procedural precepts. The Committee intended to craft a national
code of procedure which was simple, uniform, and trans-substantive;
that is "procedure generalized across substantive lines"10 and that facilitated the inexpensive, prompt disposition of disputes and meritbased resolution." The Committee attempted to realize these purposes through many means. For instance, the Committee promoted
simplicity and disposition on the merits by reducing the importance
of pleadings, by providing for broad, flexible discovery, and by limiting the number of steps in cases.' 2 The Committee correspondingly
fostered uniformity by commanding all of the federal districts to apply
identical procedures.' 3 The drafters also left counsel substantial con-.
trol ov'er lawsuits, particularly prior to trial and in discovery.' 4 The
Committee as well increased judges' discretion and trusted to this discretion application of the rules, which the Committee contemplated
that courts would flexibly and practically interpret and enforce. 15

8 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of FactPleading Underthe FederalRules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 439 (1986); Subrin, supra note 7, at 948-73. See
generally CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965).
9 Act of June 1, 1872, cfi. 255, 17 Stat. 196, 197. See generally CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 61 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing the Conformity Act
Equity Rules).
10 Cover, supra note 6, at 718. See generally Carl Tobias, The Transformation of
Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (1992).
11 For analyses of these and other significant goals of the Committee, see Resnik,
supranote 6, at 502-15; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure,67
A.B.A. J. 1648, 1648-51 (1981); and Tobias, supra note 2, at 272-77.
12 See Subrin, supra note 11, at 1649-50; Tobias, supra note 2, at 274; see also
Marcus, supra note 8, at 439-40.
13 See Subrin, supra note 11, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 2, at 274-75.
14 See Resnik, supra note 6, at 512-15; Subrin, supra note 11, at 1650.
15 See Subrin, supra note 7, at 968-73; Tobias, supra note 2, at 275-76 & n.28.
The tenets are not absolutes; some were in tension and even conflicted. The choices
of an equity-based scheme and of flexible, liberal procedure facilitated court access
and costly, lengthy complex cases. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1591 n.3 (1994); infra notes 32, 35-37
and accompanying text.
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Critical to local procedural proliferation was the Advisory Committee's determination to include Rule 83.16 This provision authorized all districts and individual judges to prescribe local measures,
thus empowering them to promulgate local strictures which could
erode the national, uniform, simple system of civil procedure instituted. 17 The drafters did intend to limit this authorization. The Committee apparently envisioned that districts would sparingly invoke
Rule 83 to address unusual, troubling local circumstances 18 and expressly prohibited the adoption of local procedures which conflicted
with the federal rules. 19
Professor Stephen Subrin has recently afforded a valuable, specific account of the Advisory Committee's promulgation of Rule 83.20
He concluded that Congress had expressly granted local rulemaking
power to the federal trial courts from their inception in 1789 until
187221 but that passage of the Conformity Act of 1872 reflected legislative intent to limit this power sharply. 22 Notwithstanding Congress's
°purpose, the Advisory Committee appreciated that local strictures
under the 1872 statute had "become an important part of the procedural landscape" and that opinion was divided about the degree to
which this practice should continue under the Rules Enabling Act
23
regime.
Professor Subrin found Advisory Committee deliberations and
proposals to suggest that the "drafters saw a necessity for local rules to
meet local conditions and for some body of law to fill the gaps not
covered by the federal rules. ' 24 Rule 83's final version enabled a ma-

jority of the judges in every district to prescribe local rules that did not
conflict with other applicable law but rejected a provision for a supervisory entity, such as appellate courts, to monitor these procedures. 25
Professor Subrin also stated that the phrasing of Rule 83 "might be
16 See FED. R. CIv. P. 83, 308 U.S. 765 (1938); see also Subrin, supra note 1, at
2016-19.
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83; see also supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
18 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1937 adoption); see also Subrin, supra note 1, at 2011-16.
19 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83; see also Carl Tobias, CivilJustice Reform and the Balkanizalion of Federal Civil Procedure,24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1393, 1397-99 (1992).

20 Subrin, supra note 1, at 2011-16.
21

Id. at 2012; see alsoJACK

B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCE-

22

117 (1977).
Subrin, supra note 1, at 2011-12; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.

23

Subrin, supra note 1, at 2012-13.

24

Id. at 2013.

25

See

DURES

FED.

R. CIv. P. 83; see also Subrin, supra note 1, at 2014.
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expected to result in material nonuniformity among district courts
26
under the emerging new scheme."
. C.

The First Three Decades of the Federal Rules

The national rule revision entities, especially the Advisory Committee, and federal judges maintained and promoted the essential
procedural precepts, namely uniformity and simplicity, during the
three decades after the federal rules' promulgation in 1938, and judicial officials and scholars generally accorded the original rules a warm
reception.2 7 The Advisory Committee suggested a comparatively
small number of amendments, and judges experienced few problems
construing and applying the initial rules and lauded their effectiveness.2 8 The judiciary sustained simplicity with a general notice pleading regime that it practically and flexibly enforced, 29 while numerous
districts and individual judges preserved and fostered uniformity by
limiting the local prescription of strictures, particularly requirements
that conflicted with the federal rules.30
Some of the rules which the Supreme Court promulgated in 1938
enjoyed less efficacy, and their judicial application seemingly undermined several fundamental procedural. tenets during the ensuing
thirty years. 3 ' For instance, broad discovery prompted certain
problems, namely greater expense and delay, and a number of attorneys abused lawyer control over this process in ways that disadvan32
taged their adversaries, especially in complicated lawsuits.
Most applicable to local procedural proliferation was the willingness of numerous district courts and individual judges to adopt local
requirements, particularly strictures that contravened the federal
rules or acts of Congress, thus honoring in the breach Rule 83's prohi26
27
28

Subrin, supra note 1, at 2016.
See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1592-93; Tobias, supra note 2, at 277-79.
See generally Charles E. Clark, "Clarifying"Amendments to the Federal Rules, 14
OHIO ST. L.J. 241 (1953); Symposium, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958,'
58 COLUM. L. REV. 435 (1958); see also generally Marcus, supra note 8, at 439-40; Tobias, supra note 2, at 277-78 (discussing the federal rules during the first quarter
century).
29 See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); see also Marcus, supra note 8, at 439-40, 445-46.
30 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 2016-19; see also infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
31 See Tobias, supranote 15, at 1593; Tobias, supra note 2, at 278.
32 See, e.g., New Dyckman Theater Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheus Corp., 16 F.R.D.
203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); see also Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions To Effectuate Pretrial
Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480, 480-81 (1958) (1950s account); Subrin, supra note
7, at 982-84 (later account).
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bition on inconsistency. 33 In fact, during 1940, a brief two years after
the Court prescribed the original rules, the Knox Committee determined that districts and judges had failed to abolish a significant number of conflicting local rules which antedated Rule 83's issuance and
had even implemented some inconsistent local rules after the 1938
federal rules' promulgation. 34 This local procedural proliferation
eroded national uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity. In
short, district courts and specific judges relied upon Rule 83, which its
drafters intended would provide flexibility to treat peculiar, problematic local circumstances and whose use was hedged with proscriptions,
especially on the application of conflicting local strictures, to adopt
local requirements that promoted inconsistency and complexity.
D.

The Federal Rules Since the 1970s

By the 1970s, a number of developments had fostered increasing
disenchantment with the federal rules. Some observers contended
35
that the federal courts were encountering a "litigation explosion,"
whereby counsel and parties were pursuing too many civil lawsuits, a
number of which lacked merit.3

6

Additional critics found troubling

the abuse of the litigation process, particularly in discovery, by lawyers
and clients. 37 Certain judges and attorneys argued that the federal

rules were unresponsive to these difficulties and that a few features of
the initial rules, namely their flexible, open-ended character, 38 especially during discovery, might even have led to the complications. Local procedures became important vehicles for implementing several
solutions-such as increased emphasis on managerial judging and on
the pretrial process and enhanced judicial discretion-which districts
33 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 2016-19; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 83; supra notes
16-19 and accompanying text.
34

See

REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITEE ON

LocAL Dis-

III, at 1-11 (1940). See generally Subrin, supranote 1, at 2016-19
(discussing the Knox Committee Report).
35 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECIivES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (A. Leo
Levin & Russell Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter THE POUND CONFERENCE]; Francis R.
Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, in id. at 211-12;
TRIGr COURT RULES

see also Tobias, supra note 2, at 287-89 (discussing debate over litigation explosion).

36 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Arthur R. Miller,
The Adversary System: Dinosauror Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1984).
37 See, e.g., Order Amending the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Nat'l Hockey League v.

Metro.

Hockey Club, 427 U.S.

639, 643 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41
(1975).
38

See sources cited supra notes 28, 35-37.
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and judges applied in attempting to rectify the problems identified in
this paragraph.
1. Managerial Judging
In the latter half of the 1970s, numerous judges, primarily in trial
courts serving large populations or metropolitan areas, such as the
Northern Districts of California and Illinois and the Southern District
of New York, began developing ad hoc remedies for these difficulties,
a practice that some observers called "managerial judging."39 Courts
and judges invented a number of measures that promoted more active
judicial involvement in civil litigation, particularly its pretrial phase.
Districts and judges used pretrial conferences to control the pace of
lawsuits, to clarify and resolve issues in contention, and to promote
settlement, especially by invoking a broad spectrum of alternatives to
dispute resolution (ADR).40 Quite a few judges attempted to manage
more rigorously the scope or timing of discovery, and some imposed
sanctions on counsel or clients for abusing the discovery or litigation
processes. 4 1 Moreover, certain courts and judicial officials created
new mechanisms, such as mini-trials and mandatory summary jury trials, to treat the complications. 4 2 Numerous districts and individual
judges practiced much managerial judging before the 1983 federal
rules amendments by promulgating local procedural requirements,
many of which contravened the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
United States Code provisions.
The 1983 Federal Rules Amendments

2.

The 1983 revisions to Rules 11, 16, and 26 expanded attorneys'
responsibilities as officers of the court, enlarged judicial discretion to
control and manage lawsuits, principally during the pretrial phase and
39

See, e.g.,

STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN

DISTRICT COURTS (1977); Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation
and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 647, 657-78 (1988). See generally
Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982) (assessing managerial
judging).
40 SeeJethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 437 (1986); Robert F. Peckham, The FederalJudgeas a Case Manager:The New Role in Guiding a Casefrom Filingto Disposition, 69
CAL. L. REv. 770, 770-79 (1981); Resnik, supra note 39, at 391-400.
41 See Peckham, supra note 40, at 795-804; Resnik, supra note 39, at 391-400.
42 See E. ALLAN LiND & JOHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISrRiCT COURTS (1983); Frank E. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing,70 F.R.D. 79, ill (1976) (addressing the National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice).
UNITED STATES
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discovery, and required that judges impose sanctions when lawyers or
litigants violated the amendments' commands. 43 Revised Rule 16 increased district judges' authority to manage lawsuits by relying on pretrial conferences and scheduling orders and by empowering courts to
sanction those who contravened the amendment's requirements,
while revised Rule 26 authorized judges to restrict discovery's scope
and pace and to levy sanctions for violations of the provision's mandates. 4 4 The new version of Rule 11 supplemented the Rule 16 and 26
prescriptions for managerial judging by mandating that courts sanction attorneys and parties for failing to conduct reasonable inquiries
before they filed papers and increased the duties and accountability of
counsel. 4 5 These modifications, therefore, essentially codified certain
practices which courts had employed under the rubric of managerial
judging, even as the changes empowered judges to adopt conflicting
local strictures and facilitated the erosion of national uniformity and
simplicity, significant precepts that underlay the initial federal rules.
For example, the 1983 amendments in Rules 16 and 26 and the 1985
Manualfor Complex Litigation, Second-which prescribed different procedures for resolving specific types of cases, such as complex and "ordinary" litigation-assumed that judges would tailor measures, often
ad hoc, to particular kinds of suits, 46 thereby multiplying the possibili47
ties for inconsistent local requirements' prescription.
3.

Local Procedural Proliferation
a.

How Local Proliferation Occurred

Numerous phenomena examined above contributed to the
proliferation of local procedures that has transpired since adoption of
the 1938 federal rules but which apparently became so problematic by
the 1980s that the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress felt compelled to respond. 48 In 1986, the Conference commissioned the Local Rules Project to collect, organize, and evaluate all of
43

See Order Amending Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983). See

generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFEGTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBIL-

rrv (1984) (assessing the 1983 revisions).
44 See OrderAmending Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. at 1097; see also In re
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Lit., 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st Cir. 1988); Subrin, supra note 11, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 2, at 292 n.148.
45 See OrderAmending Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. at 1097.
46 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND §§ 33.1-.6 (1985).
47 See Subrin, supra note 11, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 2, at 292 n.148.
48 See Tobias, supranote 19, at 1397-99; Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process,56
U. Prrr. L. REV. 801, 817 (1995); see also supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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the existing local rules, standing orders, and additional practices of
individual judges and other local measures to ascertain whether the
strictures were creating difficulties and, if so, to formulate recommendations for addressing those problems. 49 Three years later, the Project published a report stating that districts and judges had adopted
approximately 5000 local rules and many additional requirements, diversely described as general, standing, scheduling, special, or minute
orders-numerous of which were unwritten-that covered local practice. 50 Some procedures were inconsistent with the federal rules, acts
of Congress, or measures in the remaining courts. 5 1 Districts and specific judges promulgated and applied conflicting strictures, despite
prohibitions on doing so in Federal Rule 83 and the Rules Enabling
Act.52

The Local Rules Project determined that the local commands
governed a wide spectrum of procedural issues. The most broadly
prescribed requirements pertained to the pretrial process, especially
pretrial conferences and discovery. 53 A number of districts and judges
employed special techniques for tracking and attempting to conclude
relatively early in litigation, routine, simple lawsuits, such as social security appeals, while a significant percentage of courts imposed pre54
sumptive numerical restrictions on interrogatories.
The substantive content of the local measures and the provision
made for their adoption, communication, and application seemed
more responsive to the needs of judges, attorneys, and parties in the
local districts or of those judges vis-A-vis the counsel and litigants, than
to national uniformity and simplicity. For instance, a number of district courts imposed rather onerous requirements on lawyers who
wished to practice in the districts but were not members of the bars of

49

SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMM. ON

CEDURE, REPORT OF THE

LOCAL RuLEs

RuLEs

OF PRACTICE AND PRO-

PROJECT: LOCAL RuLEs ON CIVIL PRACTICE

(1989) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE LOCAL RUL.S PROJECT]; Daniel R. Coquillette ,et
al., Tie Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B~A. J. 62, 62-65 (1989) (summarizing the Project).

50

See REPORT

OF THE

LOCAuL RuLEs

PROJECT,

supra note 49, at 1; see also U.S. Dis-

Tmar COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONT., CIVIL JuSTiCE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN

3-4 (1991) (applying unwritten measures).

51 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 2025.
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994); FED. R. Civ. P. 83; see also Subrin, supra note 1,
at 2020-26. See generally Coquillette et al., supra note 49, at 62-65 (summarizing the
Project).
53

See REPORT

OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT,

supra note 49, at 1-3.

54 See 14JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE § 83.02 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter MooRE's 3d]; see also Subrin, supra note 1, at 2020-26.
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the jurisdictions in which the courts were situated. 55 A few specific
judges even mandated that counsel obtain their permission prior to
filing motions. 56 Some courts and individual judges prescribed and
enforced strictures covering important aspects of practice without
seeking any input from the bar or the public before, and occasionally
57
after, publishing measures.
Appellate courts rarely examined the promulgation or invocation
of these requirements. 58 The tiny financial stakes, and the abstract
procedural principles, that typically were at issue may well have dissuaded many attorneys and parties from challenging the measures.
Even those who might have had the requisite resources and interest to
seek the strictures' invalidation could have been unwilling to jeopardize ongoing, cordial relationships with judges in whose courts they
would later appear. Some of the few potential challenges that remained may have implicated unreviewable judicial decisions. 5 9
This account of proliferating local requirements shows how increasing emphasis on the pretrial process and enhanced judicial discretion to manage it were concomitants of proliferation. The
widespread adoption of local provisions by districts and judges correspondingly undermined the national, uniform procedural regime instituted in the federal rules, imposed unnecessary expense and delay,
and complicated civil practice, particularly by making it more difficult
to discover, comprehend, and comply with the growing number of
inconsistent and repetitive requirements. 60
55 See, e.g., D. MONT. R. 110; E.D. VA. R. 7; see also Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641,
643 (1987). See generally RICHARD A. WILLIAMSON, NEW YoRK COUNTY LAwYERs' AssociATION REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE FEDERAL COURTS ON PRO HAC VicE ADMISSIONS

Pro Hac Vice Admissions 1996), reprinted in
169 F.R.D. 390, 404-08 (1997).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 984 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1993); Richardson
Greenshields Sec. v. Mui-Hin Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 649 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Brown v.
TO THE FEDERAL COURTS (Subcomm. on

Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1009 (11th Cir. 1992).
57 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1985 amendment); see also 28
Uf S.C. §§ 332, 2071 notes (1994).
58

See A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139

U. PA. L. REv. 1567, 1576 (1991); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
59 Circuit judicial councils that Congress and the Court asked to review the measures also gave them little scrutiny. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 note; FED. R. CIv. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1985 amendment).
60

Authority's accretion in district courts facilitated by proliferation, which the

"local rulemakers, each guided by individual understandings of process" had effected,
was dubbed the "procedural equivalent of Luther's Ninety-Five Theses." Stephen C.
Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631,

672-73 n.134; see also infranotes 132-36, 142-43, 202-23 and accompanying text (analyzing additional effects of proliferation).
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b.

Responses to Local Procedural Proliferation

Congress and the federal judiciary implemented several responses to the problems which local procedural proliferation
presented. 61 The Judicial Conference supported the 1985 revisions of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, which mandated that districts prescribe local rules after
providing notice, and an opportunity for comment, to the public and
that standing orders which individual judges issue not contravene the
Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure or local rules. 62 The Advisory Committee's notes that accompanied these amendments asked
all of the courts to implement processes for adopting and monitoring
standing orders, and requested that circuit judicial councils assess
every local rule for validity and for conflicts with all of the federal
rules and with local strictures in the remaining districts, implying that
63
the councils should change local rules found to be inconsistent.
Five decades after the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took
effect, Congress adopted the JIA, important objectives of which were
to restore the primacy of those rules and of the national rule revision
process and to limit local proliferation. 64 Senators and representatives apparently intended that the legislation would revive and promote significant procedural concepts, including uniformity and
simplicity, which animated the Advisory Committee's drafting of the
65
original federal rules.
Congress meant to address proliferation by regularizing and
opening to public participation and input local processes for modifying procedures. The statute required every district to appoint a local
rules committee which would aid all of the court's judges in developing local strictures and to afford notice and comment before the district promulgated new, or revised existing, local rules. 66 Moreover,
senators and representatives expressly attempted to reduce proliferation by assigning circuitjudicial councils the affirmative duty to review
61 The Judicial Conference instituted the Local Rules Project study and upon its
receipt issued an order asking districts to conform local strictures to the federal rules
and suggesting ways to treat proliferation. See Tobias, supranote 19, at 1399; Tobias,

supranote 15, at 1597.
62

See FED. R. CIv. P. 83;

FED.

R. CRiM. P. 57; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory

committee's note (1985 amendment). The revisors did not amend analogous appellate or bankruptcy rules. See FED. R. APP. P. 47; FED. R. BANR. P. 9029.
63 See, e.g., FED. I Civ. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1985 amendment).
64 SeeJudicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d) (4), 2071-2074 (1994)).
65 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1599-1601.
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994).
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periodically all local requirements for consistency with the federal
rules and by authorizing these entities to alter or abrogate specific
strictures found to conflict. 67 Congress seemingly intended that those
68
commands would govern measures prescribed by individual judges.
4. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
Legislative enactment of the CJRA and its implementation essentially discontinued effectuation of the directives in the 1988 JIA and
Civil Rule 83's 1985 amendment that were meant to decrease local
procedural proliferation. 69 The manner in which Congress passed
the CJRA, the legislation's mandates, and its implementation demonstrate apparent congressional inability to harmonize the CJRA with
the JIA and Rule 83, a phenomenon which effectively suspended the
provisions in theJIA and Civil Rule 83 that were aimed at proliferating
local strictures.
a.

Statutory Passage

In early 1990, SenatorJoseph Biden, the Chair of the SenateJudiciary Committee, introduced proposed legislation which was primarily
based on recommendations for improving the civil justice system formulated by a task force consisting of diverse participants in federal
civil litigation. 70 This bill was very controversial. A number of judges
criticized the measure because it mandated that all ninety-four districts institute numerous cost and delay reduction requirements, while
others considered the proposal a legislative attempt to micro-manage
the courts, which avoided the ordinary federal rule amendment process orjeopardized it and the efforts of the Federal Courts Study Com67 See id. § 332(d) (4). The JIA thus imposed on councils an ongoing duty to
review measures existing on its December 1, 1988 effective date and any adopted
later. Id. § 333 note (effective date of 1988 amendment).
68 See id. § 2071 note. Section 2071 (f) made the revision process exclusive so that
judges would not avoid its mandates by giving local measures another label, such as a
standing order.
69 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1601-04. Throughout this Article, I assume that
the CJRA also suspended the 1985 rule revisions aimed at proliferation; however, this
is less important partly because Congress might have been unaware of the revisions.
70 See S. 2648, 101st Cong. (1990); see also SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S.
REP. 101-416, at 13-14 (1990); TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, BROOKINGS
INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 5-6, 12-19

(1989) (finding much dissatisfaction with the federal civil justice system and that increasing cost and delay jeopardized court access for many, while suggesting that
courts employ reforms primarily relating to judicial case management, discovery, and
ADR).
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71
mittee (FCSC) that Congress had commissioned in the 1988 JIA.
Indeed, advocates of the CJRA seemed unaware that Congress had
adopted the JIA as recently as 1988, much less attempted to reconcile
the statutes. 72 The Judicial Conference ultimately developed a "14Point Program" in response to Senator Biden's measure.78 After Congress conducted hearings and negotiated with the Conference, Congress passed an amended iteration of the proposal in November

1990.74

The CJRA was controversial when enacted, and it remains controversial today. Certain observers ask whether the federal courts have
encountered serious delay. Two significant 1990 studies ascertained
that there was less delay, particularly in the sense of time to disposition, than some critics suggested. 75 Others argue that the statute fails
to address important sources of expense and delay, such as the criminal justice system. 7 6 The CJRA's specific goal also was the facilitation
of experimentation with local techniques for decreasing cost and delay in civil lawsuits, to the almost total exclusion of additional signifi77
cant process values and procedural precepts, especially uniformity.
The legislation concomitantly included impractical objectives and
time-frames, as well as prescribed instrumentalities that lacked expertise or assigned them unclear duties, while much of the statute
71 SeeJudicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642, 4644 (authorizing FCSC); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM Acr OF 1990 FINAL REPORT: ALTERNATIVE PROPOsALS FOR REDUCTION
OF CosT AND DELAY ASSESSMENT OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES & TECHNIQUES (1997), reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62, 78 (1997) [hereinafter JCR]; see also S. REp. 101-416, supra
note 70, at 4-6, 10, 30-31.
72 There is little mention of the JIA in the CJRA's legislative history.
73 SeeS. REP. 101-416, supranote 70, at 4-6, 30-31; Lauren K. Robel, The Politicsof
Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST.J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 115, 128 (1991). Opposition
was ironic as the CJRA increased judges' discretion and power to adopt conflicting
local measures.
74 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994); see also S. REP. 101-416, supranote 70, at 3-6.
75 See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLrrCAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DIsRCr COURTS 157 (1990); TERENCE DUNGWORTH &
NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 74-75 (1990).
76 See, e.g., JCR, supra note 71, at 88-89; Avem Cohn, A Judge's View of CongressionalAction Affecting the Courts, LAW & CoNTaMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 100; Linda
S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 400-01
(1992).
77 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1466-71
(1987) (discussing process values); infra notes 79, 82 and accompanying text. But cf.
28 U.S.C. § 471 (stating that CJRA's purpose was opening court access, a critical process value).
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clashed with, and its effectuation essentially discontinued implementation of, the mandates included in the 1988JIA and the 1985 revision
of Rule 83 which were meant to limit local proliferation. 78
b.

Statutory Requirements and Implementation

The CJRA required by December 1993 that each of the ninetyfour federal district courts issue a civil justice cost and delay reduction
plan, which was "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on
the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and
79
ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."
The districts were to promulgate the plans after examining reports
and suggestions assembled by advisory groups,8 0 institutions that the
courts appointed ninety days subsequent to statutory enactment and
that were to have balanced composition.8 1 The districts evaluated the
groups' reports and recommendations and considered the inclusion
of eleven legislatively-prescribed principles, guidelines, and techniques and any additional measures which they thought might reduce
delay and expense. 8 2 The statute's proponents, therefore, contemplated that reform "from the bottom up" would foster innovation
while improving communication and promoting consensus among
83
federal court users and within and across federal districts.
The CJRA fostered considerable local proliferation, particularly
of inconsistent procedures. More specifically, the statute's twelfth
open-textured prescription implicitly encouraged districts and judges
to promulgate and enforce local requirements that conflicted with the
federal rules, United States Code provisions, and other courts' mea78 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317 § 608, 110
Stat. 3847, 3860 (extending deadlines) ;Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103420 § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345 (same); Carl Tobias, Recalibratingthe CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990, 30 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 115, 123-33 (1993) (assigning unclear duties).
79 28 U.S.C. § 471 & notes; see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The CivilJustice Reform
Act of 1990: Requiescat in Pace, 173 F.R.D. 565, 567-81 (1997).
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 472.
81 Groups were to assess "civil and criminal dockets" and identify "trends in case
filings and in the demands being placed on courts' resources" and cost and delay's
major causes while suggesting means to treat the districts', parties', and counsel's
needs and to insure that each helped reduce cost and delay. See id. §§ 472, 478.
These entities and duties show how Congress structured the CJRA in ways which could
increase proliferation because, for example, the Act may have led to group suggestions that seemed more solicitous of local judges and attorneys than of consistency.
82 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 472-473.
83 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1604.
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sures. 84 Numerous districts seemingly depended on this provision to
adopt and apply strictures that contravened exogenous commands,
and a number of courts apparently relied on the eleven prescriptions,
especially those governing discovery, to implement inconsistent local
mandates.8 5 Little in the Act or its attendant legislative history
seemed to prohibit these conflicts. 86 All of the federal districts invoked the twelve statutorily-enumerated principles, guidelines, and
techniques to effectuate diverse procedural permutations.
Numerous judges inconsistently construed the new local measures, and a few did not even apply some requirements that their districts had prescribed. Moreover, many attorneys and parties
experienced problems discovering, comprehending, and satisfying
the relevant procedures. A significant reason for this is that strictures
might have been included in plans, local rules, individual-judge procedures, orders, or informal practices, certain of which were practically
accessible only to local counsel and litigants. For instance, some districts did not reduce to writing applicable automatic disclosure measures, leaving resolution to local practices or understandings.8 7 The
CJRA as enacted, drafted, and implemented, thus, clearly facilitated
the promulgation of local measures, especially conflicting requirements, while suspending effectuation of those features of the 1988JIA
which were intended to limit proliferation.
Congress entrusted virtually every feature of CJRA implementation to the essentially unreviewable, and thus effectively complete discretion of the districts.8 8 The courts possessed and exercised nearly
84 In adopting plans, courts were to examine and could include other features
that they deemed appropriate after considering groups' suggestions. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 473(b) (6).
85

See U.S. DIsTRicr COURT FOR THE E. DIsTRIcr OF TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE

PLAN 9 (1991) (declaring that plan "has precedence and is
controlling" over conflicting federal rules); see also Tobias, supra note 19, at 1417,
1421 (examples of reliance on last proviso); id. at 1416 (providing examples of reliance on eleven prescriptions).
86 See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45
DUKE L.J. 929, 963 (1996); A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The
Challengeof the CivilJusticeReform Act of 1990, 67 ST.JoHN's L. REv. 877, 888-92 (1993);
Lauren K. Robel, FracturedProcedure: The CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L.
AND DELAY REDUCTION

REv. 1447, 1464-72 (1994).
87 SeeTobias, supra note 15, at 1621. In fairness, the CJRA had many positive
features. Congress structured the Act in ways which should have limited non-uniformity, cost, and delay, while many districts applied measures that saved expense or time.
A few difficulties may have resulted more from courts' interpretation and implementation than CJRA phrasing. See id.
88 This discretion was essentially unreviewable because the Act did not prescribe
judicial review and few cases challenged conflicting measures. See, e.g., Ashland
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absolute discretion to promulgate local strictures covering practically
any procedural area, even those already governed by the federal rules
or acts of Congress, and to enforce those requirements. 89 Because the
CJRA specifically encouraged local experimentation, and a number of
courts seemed to consider some of the statute's eleven prescriptions
and the twelfth open-ended provision as impliedly inviting the promulgation of conflicting strictures, the legislation fostered local
proliferation. 90
The CJRA and its implementation, therefore, essentially discontinued effectuation of those aspects of the 1988JIA and the 1985 revision of Rule 83, which Congress and the Court meant to limit the
proliferation of local procedures. Even the measures that attained the
CJRA's objective of reducing cost apparently did so at the expense of
uniformity and simplicity or of significant process values, such as fairness or court access. 9 1 Indeed, the legislation, by empowering district
courts to create as well as apply relevant strictures, increased their authority to prescribe inconsistent requirements.
The 1990 CJRA's purpose of decreasing cost and delay by promoting local testing with innovative measures inevitably multiplied the
number of local procedures, certain of which were conflicting, and
threatened the attainment of the goals included in the 1988 JIA and
Rule 83's 1985 amendment which were to restrict the growing quantity of mechanisms, particularly inconsistent ones. The objectives of
saving expense and time hark back to the 1938 procedural precepts of
prompt, economical dispute resolution, which the 1983 federal rules
amendments were intended to revitalize, while the cost and delay that
the 1990 CJRA was meant to limit may have resulted from the 1938
rules' uniform, simple regime that the 1988 JIA was meant to revive.
The 1990 enactment also might evince Congress's inability to perceive process very broadly or systemically. For example, the statute's
passage evidenced concern about saving money and time in civil litigation, although the few procedures prescribed, and the increased balChem., Inc. v. Barco, Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 263-68 (5th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff challenged
a local rule as conflicting with a federal rule); Laird v. Chisholm, 85 F.3d 637, 637
(9th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 57-59, 86 and accompanying text. The GJRA,
thus, increased local power by limiting appellate review.
89 The CJRA may only extend developments that local proliferation had already
begun, especially if the Act sunsets. See supra notes 33-34, 48-60 and accompanying
text.
90 CJRA circuit review committees' constitution and guidance made them reluctant to analyze CJRA measures. See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1406-13; see also Tobias,
supra note 15, at 1620-21 (reviewing circuit councils' reluctance to review measures
which CJRA seemingly authorized).
91 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1423-27; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1623-27.
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kanization produced, may have imposed greater expense and delay.
The CJRA essentially discontinued initiatives that were meant to decrease the number of local measures, especially conflicting requirements, which Congress had instituted a mere two years previously, and
92
seemingly increased proliferation and inconsistency.
5.

The 1993 Federal Rules Amendments

The most ambitious package of amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in their six-decade history took effect on December
1, 1993. 93 Some of these revisions, especially together with prior procedural developments, such as those implicating the 1983 federal
rules changes and civil justice reform, have apparently contributed to
the growth of local strictures, particularly inconsistent measures. This
Subsection focuses on the modification in Federal Rule 26, which instituted automatic disclosure because it was quite controversial and
has the greatest importance to local proliferation.
a.

Automatic Disclosure

The revision in Rule 26(a) prescribing automatic disclosure,
which commands litigants to exchange significant information about
their cases before traditional discovery, was the most controversial formal proposal ever made to amend the federal rules. 94 Practically all
elements of the bar opposed the initial recommendation that the Advisory Committee proffered because attorneys had difficulty detecting
exactly what must be revealed, thought that disclosure would add another layer of discovery, believed that the draft would pose ethical
conflicts with clients, and were concerned that the mechanism suggested could impose expense and delay.9 5 The Advisory Committee
addressed this criticism by withdrawing the original proposal during
February 1992; however, the Committee revitalized the modified dis92 Professor Yeazell may have best summarized the statute by stating that "without
a more comprehensive sense of how process works, we can look forward only to blind
vacillation between the points of a swinging pendulum as we grasp at various 'reforms,' each bringing its own unappreciated second-order effects." Yeazell, supra
note 60, at 677-78.
93 Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, *reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401

(1993).
94 See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosurein Discovery- The Rush to Reform, 27
GA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1992); Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145
F.R.D. 139, 140 (1993); Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L.
REv. 263, 265-71 (1992) (describing objections to the proposed change).
95 See Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 512 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bell et al., supra note 94, at 28-32; Tobias, supra note 94, at 141.
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closure requirements in April, and the remaining entities in the rulerevision hierarchy approved them.9 6 The United States House of Representatives agreed to omit automatic disclosure from the package of
amendments, but the Senate unexpectedly failed to act, and the dis97
closure revision took effect on December 1, 1993.

The feature of the disclosure provision that is most relevant to
proliferation was the inclusion of a local option measure, which empowered each of the ninety-four districts to alter the federal rule
amendment or to eschew it totally.98 A number of courts relied on
this procedure -to adopt local disclosure techniques that departed
from the federal rule revision or to reject it completely. 9 9 A few districts actually entrusted the determination regarding disclosure to the
discretion of individual judges of the court. 10 0 Nearly half of the districts eventually decided against employing the federal rule change.10 1
This amendment concomitantly allowed judges and parties to modify
10 2
its strictures in specific cases.
The local option procedure was quite significant. Most important, -the provision authorized districts and individual judges to promulgate and enforce local requirements that contravened the
governing federal rules and strictures in the other ninety-three districts. 10 3 The local option technique, therefore, specifically condoned

local procedural proliferation and greatly increased the potential for
conflicts, complicating and imposing expense, and delay in federal
civil litigation because, for example, the applicable measures were dif10 4
ficult to locate, understand, and satisfy.
The enormous symbolic significance of the local option mechanism may well have surpassed its great pragmatic importance. Many
96 See Paul D. Carrington, Learningfrom the Rule 26 Brouhaha:Our Courts Need Real
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 300 (1994); Tobias, supra note 15, at 1612.
97 See H.R. 2814, 103d Cong. 1 (1993); 139 CONG. REC. H8746-47 (1993).
98 See Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 431.
99 See, e.g., E.D. LA. R. 606E; D. ME. R. 18(g); see also DONNA STiENSTRA, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (FJC 1994); Cavanagh, supranote
79, at 594-95.
100 See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 2.04D; U.S. DisRmcr COURT FOR THE N. Disrsuar OF TEX.,
CrVL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2-4 (1993); see also John Flynn
Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Uniformity, Is "Source of Confusion". Critics, CHI. DAILY L.

BULL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 17.
101 See Half of Districts Opt Out of New Civil Rules, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at 5; see
also STIENSTRA, supra note 99; Rooney, supra note 100.
102 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1); Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146

F.R.D. at 432.
103
104

See generally Robel, supra note 86; Tobias, supra notes 15, 19.
See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1589.
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federal courts experts have long viewed the Advisory Committee as the
"Defender of the Faith" in the national, consistent procedural regime
which the 1938 Rules instituted. 10 5 When that entity, seemingly for
purposes of political expediency or to revive its diminishing influence,
acceded to an approach which facilitated the prescription of conflicting strictures that govern a significant constituent of the increasingly
emphasized pretrial process, thereby exacerbating local proliferation,
the Committee dealt a serious symbolic, and perhaps fatal, blow to the
06
cause of a national, uniform procedural code.'
b.

Rules 30, 33, and 16

The 1993 amendments that imposed presumptive numerical limitations on interrogatories and depositions are also relevant to proliferation.10 7 The provisions, which allow local variation and permit
judges and litigants to modify the procedures in specific cases, resemble and have effects similar to the federal automatic disclosure amendment.'10 For example, the requirements governing presumptive
limits on depositions and interrogatories have led certain districts to
opt-out of or to alter the federal rules, thus eroding uniformity and
simplicity, and imposing expense and delay. 10 9 A few revisions in Rule
16(b) covering pretrial conferences, which permit local option in
some situations and change of time strictures in particular suits might

105 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope overExperience: MandatoryInformalDiscovery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 855-56 (1991) (explaining that the
Advisory Committee is slow to accept changes in the rules, but is losing influence);
Laurens Walker, PerfectingFederal Civil Rules: A Proposalfor Restricted Field Experiments,
LAW & CoTEMp. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67 (arguing that the way changes are made
to the Rules is not good enough and proposing field experiments for proposed
changes before they are made); Yeazell, supra note 60, at 672-76.
106 I am indebted to Lauren Robel for this idea. But see Carrington, supranote 96,
at 300; but see alsoAmendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a) (1), (b), (d),
(f), 30(d) (2), 192 F.R.D. 340, 382, 390-91, 393-94 (2000) (eliminating most of the
local option provisions).
107 SeeFED. R..Cv. P. 30 (a) (2) (A), 33(a). •
108 Presumptive limits raise issues analogous to automatic disclosure. Most important is provision in specific cases for judicial modification and litigant stipulation.
109 See, e.g., D. MONT. R. 200-5(c); N.D.N.Y. GEN. ORDER No. 40 (Dec. 14, 1993).
But cf Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, reprintedin 146 F.R.D. 401, 390
(1993) (eliminating the local option provisions for limitations on depositions and
interrogatories but retaining it for Rule 36 requests for admission and retaining the
provision for judicial modification and party stipulation in specific cases).
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have similarly decreased uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity,
and increased costs. 110
The set of proposals in the preliminary draft which the Advisory
Committee prepared in August 1991 included additional procedures
that require rather brief examination because they implicate issues
which are less applicable, but relevant, to proliferation. The rule revisors deleted or withdrew a few proposals during the course of the
amendment process, while others were constituents of the 1993 modifications. The most important suggestion that did not become effective was a revision in Rule 83, which would have provided for local
procedural experimentation. The proposal empowered districts with
Judicial Conference approval to prescribe, for not more than five
years, experimental local rules that contravened federal rules.11 1 The
Advisory Committee apparently retracted the recommendation out of
deference to contemporaneous CJRA testing, thus losing a valuable
technique, which carefully balanced the need to experiment with potentially efficacious measures and to treat peculiar, problematic local
1 12
conditions against inconsistency's complications.
6.

The 1995 Amendments of the Federal Rules

During 1995, the national rule revision entities responded to certain concerns about proliferation by amending the federal civil, appellate, bankruptcy, and criminal rules, which govern the prescription of
local procedures in the respective areas. 11 3 These changes incorporate the JIA mandate that local rules not conflict with federal rules or
United States Code provisions and also proscribe duplication." 4 The
modifications correspondingly require courts to conform the numbering of local rules to any uniform system which the Judicial Conference
110 See Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure,146 F.R.D. at 427-28; see also id. at
478-79 (Rule 54(d) (2) (B), (D) revisions prescribe local option); D. MD. R. 104.1;

S.D. IND. R. 26.3.
111 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 83

(1991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY

DRAFT].
112 Compare id., withJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Table of Contents (1992) [hereinafter PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS] (deleting proposal); see alsoJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 59

(1995)

[hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN].

113 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (1995 amendment), reprinted in 150 F.R.D. 400
(1993); see also MOORE'S 3d, supra note 54, § 83.02 (estimating 6000 local civil rules in
1995). I rely in this subsection on Civil Rule 83 which typifies the other, similarlyphrased revisions.
114 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (a) (1994).
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prescribes, because consistent schemes will facilitate the efforts of an
increasingly nationalized bar and of parties to find and comply with
local measures."15 Moreover, the revisions prohibit judges from enforcing local rules that impose technical requirements in ways that
6
forfeit litigants' rights for nonwillful failures to conform."
The 1995 amendments recognize that appellate courts and district and bankruptcy judges invoke multiple directives apart from the
federal rules and local rules to regulate practice and authorize the
mandates' continued use.117 However, these commands cannot conflict with or repeat the federal rules, acts of Congress, or the local
rules." 8 Moreover, judges can only impose sanctions or other disadvantages for noncompliance with the local procedures when alleged
violators have actual notice of the strictures in specific cases," 9 notice
which may be satisfied, for example, by "furnishing litigants with a
copy outlining the judge's practices." 120 Each Advisory Committee's
note admonishes that these local directives can be problematic because their "sheer volume may impose an unreasonable barrier" to
attorneys and parties who may be unaware of, or experience difficul21
ties securing, the strictures.'
Most of the requirements included in the 1995 amendments of
the federal rules have apparently received limited imp]tementation to
date. 12 2 The principal reason why so few appellate and district courts
and individual judges have effectuated the revisions seems to be reluctance or uncertainty attributable to contemporaneous experimentation under the CJRA. Moreover, the Judicial Conference has not yet
seemingly surveyed, or enforced compliance with, its 1996 directive
prescribing a uniform numerical system to which it requested that districts conform their local rules by April 1997, although the Confer115

See FED. R. Cmy. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also id. advisory committee's note;

infra notes 123, 134, 248 and accompanying text.
116 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also id. advisory committee's note.
117

See id.; see also id. advisory committee's note.

118 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §2071 (a).
119 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also id. advisory committee's note.
120 Id. advisory committee's note.
121 Id. The Judicial Conference reinforced the revisions by urging reduction of
the "number of local rules and standing orders" and that circuit councils and the
Conference "discourage further 'balkanization' of federal practice by exercising their

statutory authority to review local court rules."
59.

LONG RANGE PLAN,

supra note 112, at

122 I rely in this paragraph on conversations with many individuals who are familiar with implementation of the 1995 amendments.
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ence rather expeditiously provided for the regime and many districts
23
have apparently complied.'
In short, the above procedural developments, particularly some
quite recent ones, such as the 1993 amendments in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and civil justice reform, as they elaborate significant prior developments, illustrate numerous concepts that involve local proliferation. Most important, they suggest that certain 1993
revisions and the CJRA's implementation essentially suspended the effectuation of mandates in several federal rules and in the 1988 JIA
which were meant to reduce proliferation, thereby permitting the further fragmentation of federal civil procedure.
E. A Survey of Local Procedures Other Than District Court
Civil Procedures
Many of the above propositions regarding local civil procedures
apparently have similar application to additional local requirements,
although the relevant developments, the precise time when they occurred, and the scope and pace of the strictures' proliferation may
differ somewhat. Most pertinent, local measures which govern appellate, bankruptcy, criminal, and admiralty cases have seemingly increased in numbers and inconsistency, while the history of their
growth resembles that for civil procedures. Thorough assessment of
all these provisions would be a mammoth undertaking which exceeds
the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, the importance for local practice of the requirements and of attempting to inform future efforts
which address proliferation means that these strictures deserve examination below.
1. Appellate Procedures
Proliferating local measures in the United States Courts of Appeals require comparatively limited evaluation, even though they have
proved particularly problematic, because Professor Gregory Sisk recently completed a comprehensive analysis of the procedures and the
difficulties which they present. 124 The Supreme Court promulgated
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) in December 1967,
123

SeeJAMEs S. KAKALIK, REPORT OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE, IMPLEMENTATION OF
CJRA IN PILOT AND COMPARISION DISTIcrs 34-35 (1996); see also supra note 116
and accompanying text; infra note 248 and accompanying text.
124 Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of AppellateJustice: The Proliferation of Local
Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 1-61 (1997).
THE
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and they became effective on July 1, 1968.125 The Court only adopted
the FRAP three decades after it had prescribed the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; however, most of the major precepts, such as uniformity, simplicity, and inexpensive, prompt dispute disposition, underlying the civil rules also supported the FRAP. Moreover, the
Supreme Court incorporated in the original FRAP 47, which is analogous to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, thereby authorizing the
appellate courts to issue and apply local measures which comported
126
with the FRAP.
These federal rules seemed to operate rather efficaciously during
the years immediately following their adoption. However, the appellate courts apparently relied on FRAP 47 or other authority to prescribe increasing numbers of local strictures that govern appeals,
many of which contravened the FRAP, relatively soon after the provisions' 1968 effective date. Two decades later, the JIA specifically prohibited appellate courts from prescribing inconsistent local rules and
mandated periodic Judicial Conference review of local strictures and
the abolition or modification of any provisions which it deemed in
conflict with the FRAP. 1 27 During 1995, the national revisors adopted
an amendment in FRAP 47, which closely resembles the 1995 modification in Federal Civil Rule 83 but expressly instructs that "[a] generally applicable direction to a parties or a lawyer regarding practice
before a court must be in a local rule rather than an internal operat1 28
ing procedure or standing order."
When Professor Sisk reviewed local appellate courts' requirements, he found a "remarkable disunity in rules of appellate practice
among the federal courts of appeals, including notable instances of
actual conflict between local practice and the FRAP."' 29 Perhaps most
disturbing was his determination that resulted from assessing a "few
central elements of the ordinary civil appeal," rather than thoroughly
canvassing "all local circuit rules on all aspects of appellate
30
practice."'
125 Judicial Conference of the U.S., Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
FederalRules of Appellate Procedure, 43 F.R.D. 61, 61 (1968); Sisk, supra note 124, at 5
n.19.
126 See FED. R. App. P. 47; see also supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
127 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 2071(c)(2) (1994).
128 FED. R. App. P. 47 (1995 amendment); see also id. advisory committee's note
("[A] local rule may not bar any practice that [the FRAP] explicitly or implicitly permit."); supra notes 59, 108-09 and accompanying text (indicating Federal Civil Rule
83's 1995 revision and FRAP 47 was not revised in 1985).
129 Sisk, supra note 124, at 7.
130 Id. at 8.
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However, the diversity and complexity of local rules is more pronounced with respect to other special appellate matters, ranging from
applications for a stay or a writ of mandamus at the outset of the appellate process to petitions for rehearing and applications for attorney's fees at the conclusion of an appeal.1 3 1
Professor Sisk ascertained that the proliferation of inconsistent
and duplicative local appellate requirements has numerous detrimental impacts. 13 2 He asserted that local variations on, and supplementation of, the FRAP hinder efficient and cost-effective pursuit of appeals
and deny justice in specific cases. 13 3 Professor Sisk also claimed that
the expanding number and complexity of local commands hamper
thorough understanding and increase the possibilities for innocent
error, while the need to find, comprehend, and comply with the stric13 4
tures requires inordinate, unnecessary expenditures of resources.
He correspondingly observed that proliferation multiplies the opportunities for construction and application of procedural requirements
and for concomitant mistakes by judges and court staff.135 Indeed,
Professor Sisk concluded that the "radiation of inconsistent circuit
rules poses a direct challenge to the fundamental concept of a federal
136
procedure."
2.

Bankruptcy Procedures

Local bankruptcy measures have similarly proliferated. However,
they warrant relatively brief consideration here because Professor
MaryJosephine Newborn Wiggins recently finished a thorough examination of the local strictures when serving as the reporter for the
Committee for the Review of Local Bankruptcy Rules, which the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Council appointed. 137 Prior to 1973, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a series of general orders covered
procedure in the bankruptcy courts, but that year the Supreme Court
promulgated the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP).

138

131 See id.
132 See id. at 5-6, 25-34.
133 See id. at 6, 26-30.
134 See id. at 6, 30-33; see also Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422.
135 See Sisk, supra note 124, at 33-34; see alsoJohn B. Oakley, An Open Letter on
Reforming the Process of Revising the FederalRules, 55 MONT. L. REV. 435, 445 (1994).
136 Sisk, supra note 124, at 6 (emphasis in original).
137 MaryJosephine Newborn Wiggins, Globalism, Parochialismand Procedure:A Critical Assessment of Local Rulemaking in Bankruptcy Court, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1245, 1245-48

(1995).
138

See id. at 1249. See generally HAROLD REMINGTON,
457-615 (6th ed. 1955).
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Since the 1970s, bankruptcy judges have relied on FRBP 9029, which
is the analogue of Federal Civil Rule 83, or other powers to adopt and
apply expanding numbers of local requirements, many of which contravene or duplicate the FBRP or statutes. 139 The 1995 revision of
FRBP 9029, therefore, imposed mandates proscribing these local provisions, commands that are virtually identical to those in Civil Rule
83.140

The bankruptcy judges have apparently promulgated and enforced numerous inconsistent and redundant local measures. Professor Wiggins' "survey of local bankruptcy rules in the Ninth Circuit
reveal[ed] some conflict with the federal bankruptcy rules and the
Bankruptcy Code [and that] many districts have created local bankruptcy rules that merely repeat existing federal law."' 4 1 She found
that "inconsistencies can lead to the misapplication of federal law
[meaning that parties] receive different treatment in different districts [and] impose unreasonable barriers to access for some litigants."1 42 Professor Wiggins correspondingly observed that
repetitious local "rules impair the efficient operation of the bankruptcy courts" by wasting judicial and administrative resources on
drafting and distribution of the strictures as well as attorneys' and litigants' money and time on discovering, comprehending, and satisfying
143
the measures.
This proliferation is particularly important because bankruptcy
filings comprise the fastest growing category of lawsuits on the federal
district court docket. 44 Finding, understanding, and conforming to
more local bankruptcy provisions, some of which are inconsistent or
redundant, and the need to use local counsel who are familiar with
local practice can consume resources. 45 Local bankruptcy requirements have also imposed an additional layer of procedural obstacles,
prompting appeals that challenge bankruptcy judges' authority to
139 Rule 927 was the predecessor of FRBP 9029. See Wiggins, supra note 137, at
1250.
140 See FED. R. BANKR.P. 9029 (authorizing bankruptcy judges to adopt local measures other than local rules but to adopt local rules only when district courts delegate
power).
141 Wiggins, supra note 137, at 1251, 1255.
142 Id. at 1254-56.
143 See id. at 1256; see also id. at 1255 (characterizing large number of repetitive
local rules as "primary threat to efficiency of bankruptcy courts").
144 See ADMiN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURTS CASELOAD CONTINUES
UpwARD SPIRAL (1997) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review) [hereinafter UpWARD

145

SPIRAL].
See Letter from MaryJo Wiggins, Professor of Law, University of San Diego, to

Carl Tobias (Mar. 18, 1997) (on file with author).
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adopt local strictures and additional disputes, while the measures
might have restricted court access for certain parties, such as those
with limited financial or political power. 146 These considerations,
which have apparently hindered litigation's economical and speedy
resolution, are critical in bankruptcy because the factors can deplete
the assets that are available to creditors by, for instance, committing to
147
case processing resources which they might otherwise recover.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF EFFORTS To LIMIT LOCAL
PROCEDURAL PROLIFERATION

The description of local procedural proliferation's history in Part
I of this Article suggests that the mandates relating to review of those
provisions in the respective federal rules which govern the adoption of
local requirements and in the JIA have received very little implementation. I initially examine this effectuation, emphasizing civil procedures. This Part then explores the explanations for, and the
implications of, truncated implementation. I conclude with lessons to
be derived from this experience.
A.

Implementation of Local ProceduralReview

1. Civil Procedures
The duties regarding periodic local review of civil procedures for
consistency and duplication and possible abrogation or alteration
which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and the 1988 JIA imposed
on circuit judicial councils, the ninety-four federal district courts, and
individual judges have received circumscribed effectuation. I focus on
the councils' efforts because those entities have greater responsibility
146 See id.
147 The historical dearth of local criminal procedures has made their proliferation
less problematic. The District of Kansas with thirty-eight civil, but only seven criminal, rules is illustrative. See FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RuLEs (2d ed. West Group 1997).
However, developments, such as Congress's expansion of criminal jurisdiction and
criminal cases' increasing complexity, mean that districts and judges have adopted
more conflicting local measures, and this will increase. See Heiser, supra note 1, at
575-76; see also FED. R. CuM. P. 57; 1 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE §§ 1-4, at 901-902 (2d ed. 1982). Proliferation has been even less troubling in admiralty. Few districts and judges, primarily on the coasts, have adopted procedures which contravene the federal admiralty or civil rules. See Heiser, supra note
1, at 575-76; see also FED. R. CIrv. P. 81(a) (listing other cases in which federal civil
rules apply only insofar as they do not contravene procedures imposed by statute or
otherwise); 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, §§ 3201-3256 (analyzing admiralty procedure); WRIGHT, supranote 9, § 63 (discussing procedure in other non-civil cases, such
as copyright and habeas corpus).
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and ostensibly have considerable independence from the districts and
judges whose strictures the councils are scrutinizing.
a.

Circuit Judicial Councils

i.

Councils That Have Conducted Review

Several circuit judicial councils have undertaken the review of local measures that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and the JIA required. The circuit councils have approached this obligation in
numerous ways, have accorded varying levdls of scrutiny to local strictures, and have attained differing degrees of success in terms of securing local procedural modifications.
During the early 1990s, the Circuit Judicial Council for the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
performed a comprehensive review of the local measures that the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia had promulgated.' 48 The council recommended changes in a number of provi1 49
sions which the judges of the district court then implemented.
For a decade, the Fifth Circuit staff attorney's office has reviewed
thoroughly, and prepared an analysis of, all newly-adopted local rules.
A committee of the judicial council has then relied on that evaluation
in deciding whether to abrogate local provisos. The council, which
takes this responsibility very seriously, has occasionally advised district
150
and bankruptcy courts to redraft local rules deemed in conflict.
Since 1990, the Seventh CircuitJudicial Council has retained as a consultant Professor Mary Squiers, who has served for more than a decade as the Project Director of the Local Rules Project. 15 1 Professor
Squiers annually analyzes the local requirements that the federal districts within the council's purview prescribe and proffers suggestions
regarding those measures to the council. The council has evaluated
Professor Squiers's recommendations, which it generally follows, and
has asked that the districts abolish or alter some strictures, requests
which the courts have typically honored.
148 See Memorandum from David Pimentel, Assistant Circuit Executive for Legal
Affairs, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, to Local Rules Review Committee (Feb. 8,
1995) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with David Pimentel (July 22, 1994).
149 See Memorandum from David Pimentel, supra note 148; Telephone Interview
with David Pimentel, supra note 148.
150 See Letter from David Pimentel, Deputy Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the
Fifth Circuit, to Carl Tobias (July 17, 2001) (on file with author).
151 Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, Project Director of Local Rules Project (Feb. 18, 1998).
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During 1993, the Ninth CircuitJudicial Council appointed a committee to scrutinize local procedures promulgated by the fifteen districts that are situated in the Ninth Circuit.1 52 The burdensome
nature of the responsibilities entailed in reviewing all of these local
requirements frustrated this entity's efforts, and the committee suspended its attempt to conclude a comprehensive assessment. In 1994,
the judicial council delegated local procedural review to the Conference of Chief District Judges, a creation of the council, and the Conference constituted a District Local Rules Review Committee (LRRC)
under its auspices. 15 3 The LRRC, which consisted of three chief district court judges, one district clerk, two law professors, and a practitioner, undertook scrutiny of the local measures instituted in the
15 4
fifteen districts.
The LRRC secured the assistance of volunteer local reviewers,
155
who were typically law faculty or attorneys, in the fifteen courts.
These reviewers evaluated all local rules and general orders that have
the effect of local rules, except for local rules which courts adopted
pursuant to the CJRA or the 1993 federal rule revisions. 156 Reviewers
compiled lists of provisions, which conflicted with, or duplicated, federal rules or acts of Congress, and reasons for their findings and for1 57
warded them to the LRRC.

The LRRC then transmitted these analyses to the judicial officers
of each district for their assessment and response. 158 Numerous districts, upon examining these reports, decided to abrogate or change a
number of local strictures. All of the courts next sent replies to the
LRRC which evaluated them and made recommendations regarding
specific local measures to the judicial council. The LRRC suggested
that the council eliminate or modify some provisions which the districts retained and that the council propose to the national rule revision entities a few procedures for consideration in the amendment
process. For example, several courts had adopted local requirements
152 See Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, supranote 148; see also Carl Tobias, Suggestionsfor Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures,52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359,

365 (1995).
153 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 563; Tobias, supra note 152, at 365.
154 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 563. Professor Margaret Johns, U.C. Davis School
of Law, served as the extremely capable chair. I was the other law professor.
155 See id.; Carl Tobias, ContinuingFederalCivilJusticeReform in Montana, 57 MONT.

L. REV. 143, 147-48 (1996).
156 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 563-64; Tobias, supra note 155, at 147-48.
157 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 563-64; Carl Tobias, Ongoing Federal Civil Justice
Reform in Montana, 57 MONT. L. REV. 511, 515 (1996).
158 See Carl Tobias, Contemplatingthe End of Federal CivilJustice Reform in Montana,
58 MONT. L. REV. 281, 283-84 (1997); Tobias, supra note 157, at 515.
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which they premised on a federal statute that Congress had repealed, 59 while most districts had promulgated local strictures which
excused compliance with Federal Rule 5(d)'s command that certain
discovery materials be filed with the courts, provisions which directly
160
contravene this federal provision.
During early 1997, the LRRC tendered its report and recommendations to the circuit judicial council. 16 1 At a February council meeting, ChiefJudge Procter Hug, Jr. appointed a committee comprised of
Chief Judge Judith Keep of the Southern District of California and
Chief Judge Edward Lodge of the District of Idaho to review the
LRRC's submission and develop possible responses. 162 In May, the
two judges provided several suggestions for the circuit council's con-sideration. First, the committee proposed that the council not abolish
or change any local measures that the LRRC recommended be altered, but rather continue working with districts and judges to encourage their modification of the requirements. 1 63 Second, Judges
Keep and Lodge suggested that the council not commission another
local review for five years, unless ChiefJudge Hug so ordered. 6 4 The
165
circuit council subscribed to the committee proposals.
ii.

Councils That Suspended Review

The Sixth Circuit Judicial Council commenced local procedural
review in the early 1990s.1 66 The council requested that lawyers in the
staff attorney's office of the circuit executive scrutinize the local requirements'of all districts within the council's compass. The lawyers
undertook a comprehensive examination of the local strictures for
consistency and duplication but experienced difficulty in addressing
disuniform procedures adopted under the CJRA. The staff attorney's
office sought the circuit council's advice regarding this concern. During a May 1994 meeting of the council, it voted to discontinue moni159

See, e.g., D. ARiz. R. 1.17(d); D. OR. R. 1030-2; see also Federal Boat Safety Act,

46 U.S.C. § 1484(d) (1994) (affording citation to repealed statute).
160 See, e.g., D. NEV. R. 26-28; D.N.M.I.R. Civ. 26.13; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d); 14
MooRE's 3d, supra note 54, § 83.04 (stating that sixty-eight districts excuse compliance but that the Advisory Committee has refused to amend Rule 5 on five occasions).
161 Dismricr LOCAL RuL.Es REVIEW COMM., REPORT TO THE NINTH CIRCUrriJUDICIAL
COUNCIL, Executive Summary (1997); see also Telephone Interview with Margaret
Johns, Chair, LRRC (Dec. 15, 1997).
162 See Telephone Interview with Margaret Johns, supra note 161.

163
164
165
166

See
See
See
See

id.
id
id
Carl Tobias, A Sixth Circuit Story, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 983, 989 (1996).
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toring of local provisions pending the receipt of more guidance from
Congress, the Judicial Conference, or case law as to whether the CJRA
1 67
superseded the federal rules.
iii.

Councils That Have Explored Local Review

Several circuitjudicial councils have apparently explored the possibility of conducting local procedural review but have not actually undertaken analyses. For instance, the First and Third Circuit Judicial
Councils have evaluated the prospect of creating a framework for assessing local measures, which is analogous to that employed by the
Ninth Circuit. 1 68 However, neither council has formally instituted a
review process, much less completed scrutiny of relevant procedures.
Other circuit councils have collected local strictures which their districts promulgated but may not have analyzed them for consistency or
duplication. For example, the Eighth Circuit Judicial Council has
asked that districts within its scope submit all of their local require169
ments to the circuit executive office.
iv.

Councils That Have Apparently Conducted Minimal Review

A number of the circuit judicial councils have seemingly performed minimal meaningful evaluation of local measures. My conversations with personnel in the circuit executive offices, law professors,
and practitioners in the Second, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
suggest that the councils have conducted little, if any, review. The
Fourth Circuit is illustrative. Samuel W. Phillips, the Fourth Circuit
Executive, stated that scrutiny of all local strictures adopted by district
courts would be a "mammoth task" because the Fourth Circuit in170
cludes nine federal districts and the council has few resources.
Phillips observed that the circuit council thinks that any difficulties
17 1
involving local provisions would "readily surface and be treated."'
167 SeeJudicial Council of Sixth Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Minutes of Meeting
3-4 (May 4, 1996).
168 See Telephone Interview with Andrew Tietz, Assistant Circuit Executive, U.S.
Courts for the First Circuit (July 22, 1994); see also Telephone Interview with Theresa
Burnett, Assistant Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the Third Circuit (Nov. 30, 2001);
Telephone Interview with Susan Kruger, Deputy Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the
First Circuit (Nov. 30, 2001); Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, supra note
148.
169 See Telephone Interview with David Day, Professor of Law, University of South
Dakota (Apr. 10, 1997).
170 Telephone Interview with Samuel W. Phillips, Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts
for the Fourth Circuit (Jan. 18, 1995).
171 Id.
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Then-Chief Judge Sam J. Ervin, III examined the practicability of assessing every local measure prescribed by districts within the court for
consistency, but he concluded that it was "not feasible for the Fourth
Circuit to undertake such a review" without more personnel or
172
money.
b.

Districts and Individual Judges

I am aware of some federal districts which have performed the
review of local procedures that Federal Civil Rule 83 and theJIA mandated. Most of these courts simultaneously scrutinized local requirements and abolished or altered them in the context of implementing
the CJRA or the 1993 federal rules amendments, while virtually no
districts have monitored standing orders or other strictures that individual judges issue and apply.
Certain federal districts did review and change their local procedures when effectuating the CJRA or the 1993 federal rules revisions.
For example, courts in several multi-district states promulgated the
same local rules, while a few courts abrogated or modified conflicting
local measures. The efforts of the Northern and Southern Districts of
West Virginia are illustrative. 7 3 The courts named working groups
that capitalized on implementation of the CJRA and the 1993 federal
amendments to undertake the development of an identical set of local
rules. 174 Multiple federal districts in Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, and
New York similarly appeared to seize on the opportunity which CJRA
experimentation afforded by adopting the same local rules within the
respective states.' 75 Federal district judges in the District of Maryland
and the Eastern District of Virginia have also scrutinized the courts'
local rules and claimed that they found no conflicts with the federal
rules or acts of Congress.' 76 The increased balkanization engendered
172 Letter from Samuel W. Phillips, Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the Fourth
Circuit, to Carl Tobias (Feb. 14, 1995) (on file with author).
173 Cf Carl Tobias, CivilJusticeReform in the Fourth Circuit,50 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
89, 99-105 (1993) (discussing early CJRA implementation and local rule review in
those districts).
174 Telephone Interview with John W. Fisher, II, Professor of Law, West Virginia
University (Jan. 20, 1995).
175 See, e.g., Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the Northern & Southern Districts
of Iowa; Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the Eastern & Western Districts of Kentuck; Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the Eastern, Middle & Western Districts of
Louisiana; Local Rules, U.S. District Courts for the Eastern & Southern Districts of
New York.
176 See Telephone Interview with Judge Robert E. Payne, Chair, Local Rules Committee, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Jan. 25, 1995); Tele-
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by the CJRA experience has concomitantly led the bars in several urban districts to call for limitations on proliferation, while the courts
have instituted evaluations of local procedures in an attempt to restrict the measures. 177 Finally, I am aware of no individual judges who
have reviewed their own orders or practices for consistency.
2.

Local Procedures Other Than Civil Procedures
a.

Appellate Procedures

The duties respecting periodic local review of appellate procedures for conflicts and duplication, as well as potential elimination or
alteration which the 1995 amendment of FRA.P 47 and the JIA imposed on the Judicial Conference and the appellate courts have apparently received little, if any, implementation. I emphasize
Conference monitoring because that entity has more responsibility
and may be better positioned to comply by virtue of its distance from
the appellate courts whose strictures are being reviewed.
The Judicial Conference has instituted virtually no action to effectuate the mandates in FRAP 47 and the JIA, while delegating substantial responsibility for compliance to the Judicial Conference
Committee on Rules of Practice and Evidence (Standing Committee).178 Indeed, Professor Sisk characterized the "power to modify or
abrogate any rule prescribed by a circuit [as] little known and seldom
invoked," finding that "on only one occasion.., has the Conference
been requested to overturn a circuit rule." 179 The attorney generals
of five states asked the Judicial Conference to invalidate the Ninth
Circuit's local rule covering death penalty appeals because they believed that the prescription contravened federal law. 180 However, the
Conference diplomatically intimated that there might be a conflict
but essentially remanded the matter to the Ninth Circuit when it invited the court's reconsideration of the requirement.18 ' On July 1,
1997, the Ninth Circuit responded to the Conference overture by pubphone Interview with ChiefJudge J. Frederick Motz, Chair, Local Rules Committee,
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Jan. 24, 1995).
177 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Congress'FailedAttempt To Spur Efficiency: The Legacy of
the CivilJustice Reform Act, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1996, at 28, 30.
178 See Sisk, supra note 124, at 51-52.
179 Id. at 51.
180 Id.; see also McCabe, supra note 2, at 1690 n.182.
181 See Sisk, supra note 124, at 52; see also Carrington, supra note 86, at 978.
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lishing a draft provision for death penalty appeals as an irterim proce182
dure which was immediately effective.
I found very little evidence that the appellate courts had undertaken efforts to discharge the obligations which the 1995 revision of
FRAP 47 or the JIA imposed. My conversations with officers in the
circuit executive offices, practitioners, and law professors in the regions where the courts are located suggest that no appellate court has
voluntarily scrutinized local strictures for consistency, much less abolished or amended any requirements deemed to conflict. 183 In fairness, it may be unrealistic to expect that the appellate courts would
have rigorously implemented the command in FRAP 47 because this
mandate only took effect in December 1995 and because the revisors
did not amend the rule in 1985, while virtually all appellate courts
84
have uniformly numbered their local rules.'
b.

Bankruptcy Procedures

The mandates relating to periodic local review of bankruptcy procedures for consistency and duplication and possible elimination or
change which FRBP 9029 imposed on circuit councils, federal courts,
and individual judges have received considerably less effectuation
than those governing civil procedures. Indeed, my discussions with
staff in the circuit executive offices, practicing attorneys, and law
faculty in the areas where the courts are located indicate that virtually
185
no courts or judges have discharged this duty.
The Ninth CircuitJudicial Council has conducted the most ambitious review of bankruptcy requirements. During 1993, the judicial
council appointed a Committee for the Review of Local Bankruptcy
Rules (CRLBR) to scrutinize procedures adopted by the circuit's fifteen districts. 18 6 The CRLBR fully evaluated the procedures prescribed throughout the court and completed a comprehensive report
in 1994.187 Professor Wiggins of the University of San Diego School of
182 See 9TH CIR. R. 22-1 to -6; see also Sisk, supra note 124, at 52 n.240. It became
final in 1998.
183 Notes of conversations are on file with author.
184 See supra notes 62-63, 122 and accompanying text; infra note 249 and accom-

panying text.
Notes of conversations are on file with author.
See NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RuLEs OF PROCEDURE (1994) [hereinafter REVIEW AND ANALYSIs]; see also Wiggins, supra note 137. Because the CRLBR and the LRRC operated similarly, I
emphasize the CRLBR's aspects which were different. See supra notes 152-61 and
accompanying text.
187 See REVIEW AND ANALYSIs, supra note 186.
185

186
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Law, the entity's reporter, undertook the daunting task of collecting,
analyzing, and synthesizing all of the relevant bankruptcy requirements with some assistance from the committee members and from
law students at her institution.1 8 The CRLBR then designated strictures that it believed were conflicting or duplicative and circulated the
entity's findings to judges in the fifteen districts. The committee apparently attained the greatest success in "identifying inconsistent rules
and persuading most districts to voluntarily rescind most inconsistent
rules." 189
The CRLBR next suggested that the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council abrogate or modify local requirements that the committee found
to conflict with, or repeat, federal strictures but which districts refused
to alter.19 0 Because some courts resisted the CBLBR's overtures, and
the circuit council was not particularly assertive about invalidating certain inconsistent rules, a number of conflicting and redundant local
provisions remain in place. 191
B. Reasons for Limited Implementation of Local ProceduralReview
Numerous reasons apparently explain the growth of local procedural strictures, increasing numbers of which conflict with, or duplicate, federal rules or United States Code provisions, as well as the
inability or reluctance of the Judicial Conference, circuit judicial
councils, federal appeals courts, districts, and individual judges to implement comprehensively the commands regarding proliferation that
various federal rules and the JIA imposed. Most of these ideas apply
to all of the local measures, monitoring entities, and review mandates.

188 See REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, supra note 186; see also Letter from MaryJo Wiggins,
supra note 145.
189 Letter from Mary Jo Wiggins, supra note 145.

190

See id.

191 Local criminal and admiralty strictures have received littde review. My inquiries
of circuit executive personnel, lawyers, and law professors suggest that very few districts or judges have monitored. Several councils which reviewed civil, also evaluated
criminal, strictures. The District of Columbia's analysis included criminal measures,
as has the Seventh Circuit's annual review. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying
text. The LRRC included local criminal strictures in its work, while a few of its districts changed some conflicting measures. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying
text. The LRRC may have accorded admiralty procedures their only serious oversight
by analyzing, and making suggestions as to, all local admiralty strictures which many
districts had adopted, and a few courts modified certain measures.
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1. Reasons for Proliferation
All of the analysis above suggests that there are many explanations why the number of local procedures, some of which were inconsistent or repetitive, has steadily expanded since the 1970s. Numerous
members of the Conference, circuit councils, and appellate and district courts may have found the prohibitions on these local requirements in the respective federal rules and the JIA unclear or difficult to
effectuate; might have honored those proscriptions in the breach; or
could have believed that additional factors, such as the necessity to
treat the litigation explosion, were more important than the complications produced by conflicting and redundant local measures.
One critical consideration that seemingly prompted the promulgation and enforcement of many local strictures, a significant percentage of which were inconsistent or duplicative, was the felt need to
address the growing quantity and complexity of lawsuits that parties
19 2 Illustrapursued in the appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts.
tive is every circuit's imposition of conflicting local requirements that
were intended to facilitate inexpensive, expeditious appellate resolution, by, for example, curtailing the number of appeals which receive
oral arguments or written opinions.'9 3 The district courts and individual trial judges correspondingly prescribed local measures, certain of
which were inconsistent or redundant, to accommodate the managerialjudging and additional measures that treated their expanding and
increasingly complicated caseloads.' 9 4 Factors that are closely related
to these propositions and each other were the importance of addressing peculiar, problematic local conditions, which the federal rules frequently ignored, 19 5 and of experimenting with innovative procedures
for resolving litigation, especially mechanisms that promised to foster
economical, prompt dispute disposition.' 96
The adoption of some conflicting or duplicative local requirements may have reflected the attempts of appellate courts, districts,
192 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; see also UPWARD
note 144.

193 See, e.g., Isr CIR. R. 34.1(a);
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL

5TH CIR.

SPIRAL,

supra

R.47.5, 47.6; see also THOMAS E. BAKER,

108-35 (1994).

See generally COMM'M

ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS

ON STRUCTURAL

101-16 (1998) (ana-

lyzing case management practices); JOE CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES
WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS (1987) (analyzing
the resolution of cases without oral argument).
194 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
195

See Robert E. Keeton, The Functionof Local Rules and the Tension with Unifonnity,

50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 853, 868-71 (1989); see also Carrington, supra note 86, at 946.
196 See Levin, supra note 58, at 1579-80; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1633-34.
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and judges to improve on the national rule revisors' work or the perception that these entities' efforts were erroneous or misguided. 197
Additional inconsistent or repetitive local strictures could be ascribed
to those judicial officers whom Judge Robert Keeton characterizes as
the "unduly willful renegades among us trial judges" or to the concomitant predilections of judicial officials who might be described as
"procedural activists."1 98
2.

Reasons for Limited Implementation

Numerous concepts, some of which resemble the reasons offered
above for the growth of conflicting and redundant local procedures,
explain the limited implementation accorded those commands related to proliferation in the federal civil, appellate, bankruptcy, and
criminal rules and in the JIA. One significant reason could be that
these rules and the JIA provided insufficiently clear guidance. For example, consistency and duplication defy felicitous definition, while
the entities and people responsible for conducting local review have
seemingly experienced considerable difficulty applying the notions. 19 9
More specifically, the Judicial Conference was apparently unable or
unwilling to fulfill the broad oversight role of affirmatively scrutinizing and abrogating or changing inconsistent or repetitive local appellate measures that FRAP 47 and the statute envisioned because the
Conference confined review to those procedures, which others have
challenged and only suggested that appellate courts modify strictures
20 0
found problematic.
Even had the instructions been clearer, most institutions and individuals which the Court and Congress assigned monitoring duties
might have been reluctant to effectuate rigorously the obligations imposed out of deference to certain instrumentalities and persons, or
because they were more concerned about other phenomena, namely
the need to treat expanding caseloads. 20 1 For instance, the Judicial
Conference may have acceded to the appellate courts when analyzing
local strictures, while appellate courtjudges who were members of cir197 "Local court tinkering with the Federal Rules is inspired by a belief that the
[national] rulemakers got it wrong." Robel, supra note 86, at 1484; accord Cavanagh,
supra note 79, at .603-04.
198 Keeton, supranote 195, at 860; see also Telephone Interview with Lauren Robel,
Professor of Law, University of Indiana (Apr. 14, 1997).
199 See 14 MooRE's 3d, supra note 54, § 83.04; Heiser, supra note 1, at 563 n.44.
200 See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text; see also Letter from Daniel Coquillette, J. Donald Monan Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, to Carl Tobias (Aug. 9, 1996) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
201 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1406-11; Tobias, supra note 152, at 363-64.
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cuit councils could have deferred to district judges in reviewing their
local procedures. The belief that the appellate courts and judges
know more about appeals and about inexpensive, expeditious appellate dispute resolution generally and within their courts might have
animated the Conference. The appellate court judges on councils
may correspondingly have acceded because they thought that district
courts and judges are more familiar with the disposition of trial court
litigation generally and within each district and individual judge's
courtroom. Additional judges, serving on the Conference or circuit
councils, might have deferentially evaluated local measures out of personal or professional courtesy or respect for those officers who hold
identical positions in the judicial hierarchy.
Judges, who were members of the Judicial Conference, circuit
councils, or districts, could have experienced certain "conflicts of interest" in discharging their local review duties. One significant, generic conflict implicated every judge's responsibilities to adopt new,
and amend existing, local strictures while closely analyzing the procedures that other courts or judges promulgated. Fewjudges seemingly
wished to scrutinize, much less abolish or alter, requirements which
the jurists might have been contemplating for, or may have already
promulgated in, their courts because the judges were apparently more
concerned about advancing what they perceived as those courts' best
interests than about limiting proliferation.
Some of these judges could concomitantly have thought that they
lacked the requisite -familiarity with local conditions in the appellate
courts, districts, or courtrooms whose measures they were assessing to
institute or recommend efficacious modifications, even in procedures
deemed inconsistent or duplicative. Implicit and probably express in
certain ideas above is the sensitive character of local review. For example, many district judges jealously guard their prerogatives to prescribe and enforce local strictures, particularly individual-judge
practices.
Underlying, and perhaps driving, the limited implementation witnessed was the apparent belief of numerous Judicial Conference and
circuitjudicial council members and specific judges that the problems
attributable to conflicting and redundant local requirements are less
significant than other factors, such as the importance of addressing
expanding, and increasingly complex, caseloads. For instance, those
judges who feel inundated by burgeoning, complicated dockets may
well find that the need for economical, prompt dispute disposition
outweighs the perceived necessity to reduce inconsistent and duplicative local measures.
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Even had the institutions and people charged with restricting
local proliferation been more favorably disposed toward fully effectuating the commands in the federal rules and the JIA, additional considerations might have frustrated comprehensive implementation.
For example, the Supreme Court and Congress assigned burdensome
responsibilities for reviewing local strictures to entities and individuals
with relatively few resources for performing a broad spectrum of onerous duties. More specifically, the circuit judicial councils discharge
numerous administrative tasks, while appellate and district court
judges must resolve multiplying, complex caseloads economically and
expeditiously. Congress appropriated no funding to satisfy the new
obligations, despite the important difficulties enumerated above. The
Court and Congress also failed to even charge an instrumentality with
responsibility for monitoring compliance with any of the local review
mandates, much less for attempting to insure their rigorous effectuation. For instance, the Court or Congress could have delegated this
duty to existing institutions, including the Judicial Conference, the
Federal Judicial Center, or the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, or created a new entity, such as a "standing c6mmittee"
on local procedures.
Finally, Congress passed the CJRA which effectively suspended
compliance with the commands respecting proliferation of local civil,
but also other, procedures in the federal rules and the JIA. The CJRA
expressly empowered districts and judges to adopt local measures for
reducing expense and delay in civil litigation and implicitly encouraged their promulgation and application of inconsistent strictures. The CJRA also created circuit review committees and assigned
them unclear oversight duties, while the committees' composition differed substantially from circuit judicial councils because the committees consisted almost exclusively of chief districtjudges. Many districts
and judges, thus, may have believed that the CJRA constituted a congressional mandate to prescribe new local requirements, some of
which were conflicting. Most circuit councils, districts, and individual
judges could concomitantly have been reluctant to institute efforts
aimed at limiting proliferation, and others might have found inefficient the continuation of attempts to review non-civil procedures,
given the uncertainty which the CJRA had engendered. In short, the
CJRA essentially supplanted implementation of the local review commands in the federal civil, appellate, bankruptcy, and criminal rules as
well as the JIA.
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573

C. Implications of Limited Implementation
The growing number of local procedures, many of which were
inconsistent or redundant, and the corresponding failure or unwillingness of the entities and individuals responsible for review to effectuate thoroughly the mandates respecting proliferation in several
federal rules and theJIA had numerous significant implications. Most
of them"pertain to all of the local strictures, oversight institutions, and
review commands, while I expressly or implicitly examined above certain of these consequences.
There have been important ramifications 6f power's concentration in the federal district courts, which local procedural proliferation
and the concomitant inability or reluctance to implement comprehensively local review mandates effected. 20 2 The accretion in these
courts of much more authority, particularly power that is essentially
unreviewable and for which judges effectively do not account, can
have substantial implications for judges, attorneys, and parties, as well
as for Congress, procedural amendment instrumentalities, and the
justice system. 20 3 Quite significant, power's accumulation vests great
trust in the judgement of a single person and expands considerably
the already enormous authority of the state which federal judges
20 4
exercise.
Reliance on this expanded power and, indeed, its very existence,
may often redound to the advantage of lawyers and litigants that have
more financial or political power, are "repeat players" or are situated
in a particular district and could benefit district courts vis-a-vis most
additional entities and people.20 5 Courts of the first instance can apply, and even abuse, their enhanced authority, especially when manag202 See Levin, supranote 58, at 1572-73; Tobias, supranote 19, at 1422-27; see also
Yeazell, supra note 60, at 631-32, 676-78.
203 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422-27; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1625-32.
204 See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 6-11 (1983); see alsoJudith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Images
ofJustice, 96 YALE LJ. 1727, 1764-68 (1987).
205 Several qualifications apply. The power's exercise can vary among cases and
judges, depending, for example, on judges' political views and temperament. See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1424; see also Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 97-124 (1974) (discussing repeat players). The assertions may seem crudely instrumental, but a recent
study of employment discrimination litigation showed that some judges' procedural
application disadvantaged plaintiffs. See Phyllis Baumann et al., Substance in the
Shadow of Procedure: The Integrationof Substantive and ProceduralLaw in Title VII Cases, 33
B.C. L. REV. 211, 296-335 (1992) (discussing how the Supreme Court has used both
substantive and procedural law to favor defendants in Title VII cases); see also Tobias,
supra note 2.
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ing the pretrial process, which local proliferation frequently
accommodates, in ways that detrimentally affect some attorneys and
parties. For instance, district court judges may have exercised this
power in the pretrial process to control and attempt to end civil litiga20 6
tion by extracting settlements from reluctant lawyers and litigants.
The increasing emphasis on; the ever-expanding number of steps
in; the growing demands for writing, filing, and signing documents
and for attending conferences during; 20 7 and the enhanced judicial
decisionmaking necessitated at the pretrial phase 20 8 have facilitated
power's accretion. The application of this enlarged authority has disadvantaged most counsel and parties with the least economic and political power. A clear illustration of these concepts is that the need to
research and draft the papers and to participate in the activities has
further depleted their scarce resources and complicated efforts to
20 9
prove cases, reach trial, and complete litigation.
The accumulation of authority in courts of original jurisdiction,
particularly when conjoined with increasing judicial discretion, which
the 1938 federal rules and numerous subsequent revisions have afforded, has similarly affected counsel and litigants who possess little
time, money, or political influence. Judicial discretion is an instrument of power, the exercise of which frequently has the most detrimental impacts on these attorneys and parties. 2 10 For example,judges
have applied the broad discretion which many federal rules bestow on
them to require that the lawyers and litigants tender documents or
206 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 45-47 (E.D. Ky. 1987); see also
Yeazell, supranote 60, at 657-59. In Lockhart, the authority's exercise was blatant and
was invoked against an insurer. It often is subtler and is used against those with less
power and resources. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 884-85 (7th
Cir. 1988); Williams v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 789 F.2d 881, 881-82 (11th Cir.
1986); see also Baumann et al., supra note 205, at 286-88; Tobias, supra note 2, at
310-19.
207 Some of these requirements elaborate or complement the already substantial
demands, such as those in Rules 11, 16, and 26. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
208 Greater demands in pretrial have disadvantaged federal judges. For example,
presiding over more increasingly complicated conferences and making more decisions consume scarce judicial resources and limit other duties' discharge. See Tobias,
supra note 19, at 1423.
209 Increased emphasis on pretrial and trial's deemphasis can disadvantage lawyers
and litigants, who pursue, for example, personal injury orjob discrimination litigation
because they are more likely to succeed before juries in trials. See Baumann et al.,
supra note 205.
210 See Burbank, supra note 77, at 1470; see also Tobias, supra note 2, at 296-335;
Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 485, *490-506
(1988-1989).
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attend conferences or ADR sessions, which has additionally strained
211
their limited resources and made cases' pursuit more difficult.

Authority's concentration in courts of the first instance, especially
as encouraged by growing numbers of inconsistent and duplicative local procedures, has had related, important pragmatic consequences,
such as making federal civil practice even more complex. For example, the local proliferation, which CJRA experimentation typified and
exacerbated, has complicated the efforts of all attorneys and clients,
but particularly those who lack financial or political power, or are situated outside a specific district, to discover, comprehend, and satisfy
local strictures, whose adoption and enforcement have detrimentally
affected them.2 1 2 The need to search for, understand, and comply
with increasingly arcane local requirements may well have imposed
greater expense and delay in federal civil litigation. It is ironic that
procedure has experienced expanding balkanization, even as federal
practice has become more nationalized and internationalized.
The accretion of authority has also contracted the procedural
opportunities that are available. These constricted possibilities are exemplified by the imposition of numerical restrictions on interrogatories and depositions,2 1 3 which have adversely affected counsel and
litigants with few resources or limited access to information that is important to their cases because they need greater discovery to acquire
214
this material.
Numerous district judges have informally applied the enlarged
authority, particularly when managing the pretrial process, while that
and numerous other exercises of power have received little appellate
scrutiny. This authority's invocation has detrimentally affected all lawyers and parties; however, its application has most disadvantaged, and
chilled the enthusiasm of, those attorneys and litigants who lack
money and power, as they have less ability to withstand the authority's
application. Many of the above ideas have meant that public interest
entities, such as the ACLU or the National Wildlife Federation, which
participate in litigation in multiple districts, may experience problems
vindicating rights and interests in the Constitution and federal
2 15
statutes.
211 SeeTobias, supranote 19, at 1422-27; see also Tobias, supranote 15, at 1621-24.
212 See Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 603-04; Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422-27;
Tobias, supra note 15, at 1611; see also LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 112, at 59.

213 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a), 33(a); Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 449, 461 (1993).
214 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1424; Tobias, supra note 210, at 495-98.
215 See Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 603-04; Tobias, supra note 19, at 1423; see also
Tobias, supra note 210, at 495-98.
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Those judges who have invoked this enhanced authority have correspondingly exercised it at the expense of Congress, thus undermining legislative branch power. 216 For example, when federal districts or
specific judges adopt local strictures which conflict with or repeat
commands in federal rules or the United States Code, the local measures can erode those national mandates and avoid the legislative review which the Rules Enabling Act prescribes for federal rules
amendments. 2 17 To the extent that district judges have promulgated,
construed, or applied local procedural requirements in ways that inappropriately discouraged lawyers and litigants, such as civil rights plaintiffs, whose enthusiastic pursuit of cases Congress expressly instructed
the courts to foster in substantive, procedural, and fee-shifting statutes, the judiciary has concomitantly frustrated legislative intent and
218
increased judicial authority vis-a-vis congressional power.
Authority's concentration, particularly as promoted by local
procedural proliferation, has correspondingly had deleterious institutional impacts, undermining the power, prestige, and work of national
rule revision bodies, such as the Standing Committee. 2 19 These entities have generally trained their significant expertise and systemic perspective on the protection and improvement of a national, uniform
procedural regime; have developed federal rules changes which are
best for all ninety-four federal district courts; and have limited the
potential for district judges to accumulate or exercise excessive or
abusive authority, especially through the prescription and enforcement of inconsistent or redundant local strictures. 220 The growing
localization of federal civil procedure that local proliferation has encouraged, by instituting a procedural scheme which is premised on
less expertise and is more parochial and by reducing the perceived
216 See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovey in Disarray:The PervasiveMyth of PervasiveDiscovery Abuse and the Consequencesfor Unfounded Rulemaking,46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1443-44
(1994); see also Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal
Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 961-63 (1991); Tobias, supra note 2, at 296-98.

217 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994). Districtjudges who rely on the CJRA to adopt
conflicting local measures frustrate the intent of Congress and the Court in the JIA
and Rule 83 to limit inconsistency, but judges have honored these in the breach, and
the CJRA seems to authorize conflicts. See supra notes 16-26, 33-34, 48-92, 94-110,
113-23 and accompanying text.
218 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1424-25. The activity also undermines the statutory beneficiaries' vindication of substantive rights. See id.
219 See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order inJudicialRulemaking: FactionalPoliticsIs
Jeopardizingthe FederalRulemaking Process, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 161-66 (1991); Tobias,
supra note 19, at 1426.
220 See Mullenix, supra note 105, at 830-43; Tobias, supra note 216, at 961-63.
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necessity for federal amendments, has seemingly eroded the national
22
revisors' influence and even challenged their relevance. '
The accretion of authority in districts, particularly authority that
is fostered by enhanced judicial discretion to manage the increasingly
emphasized pretrial stage, has detrimentally affected the civil justice
system. The prior developments in procedure, such as the growth of
managerial judging, especially as elaborated by the CJRA's effectuation-mandating that attorneys and parties draft and file more documents and participate in increased activities, expanding litigation's
steps and enlarging ADR's importance-have arguably complicated
attempts to detect the truth and to reach the merits of cases while
decreasing the quality of justice secured. Indeed, the earlier developments, as compounded by the CJRA implementation, have apparently
produced impacts quite different from ones which Congress envisioned: they may have led to expense and delay in civil lawsuits, narrower federal court access, and fewer fair and merits-based
resolutions.2 22 The civil litigation system can even lose respect when
the public believes that the procedures available or the character of
justice can vary substantially across districts, that the nature of justice
reflects lawsuits' magnitude or subject matter, that attorneys' or clients' resources affect the quality of justice, or that complexities or
223
technicalities preclude or restrict the vindication of rights.
D:

Lessons from Local Proliferationand Limited Implementation

Numerous lessons can be derived from the experience involving
local procedural proliferation and the limited implementation that
the Judicial Conference, circuit judicial councils, appellate and district courts, and specific judges have accorded commands which the
Supreme Court and Congress intended to rectify or ameliorate detrimental effects, which the growing number of conflicting and redun221

See Mullenix, supra note 76, at 400; Tobias, supra note 19, at 1426.

222 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1426-27; see also Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 603;
supra notes 33-60, 69-112 and accompanying text.
223 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1427. Because federal civil procedure is in its
worst condition since the 1938 federal rules' adoption, state civil procedure may be
even more fragmented, especially in states that model their procedural systems on the

federal analogues. See generallyJohn B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The FederalRules in
State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367
(1986) (surveying state court systems and identifying their reliance on the federal
system); Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for CivilJustice Reforms in the
States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553 (1994) (recommending that state court systems examine
and reform their existing systems).
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dant local strictures imposed. Certain of these ideas are expressly
stated or implicit in much of the above assessment.
The efforts of the Court and Congress to restrict proliferation
afford several lessons. Those endeavors teach that initiatives aimed at
reducing proliferation must be harmonized with other activities, most
notably the attempts to decrease cost and delay through managerial
judging or the CJRA, which were frequently premised on inconsistent
local requirements. The experience also shows that institutions and
individuals charged with conducting local procedural review must
have clear guidance and adequate resources. Moreover, the work
should be carefully structured. For instance, appellate court judges
may be very reluctant, or perhaps unable, to scrutinize, much less abrogate or modify, measures which the jurists believe district judges
prescribe to improve their courts. This unwillingness could reflect a
lack of experience with local strictures, concomitant limited appreciation of the circumstances in particular districts or respect for colleagues with whom the reviewers must maintain ongoing, cordial
relations. It might even be preferable to lodge the ultimate authority
for abrogating or changing local provisions in entities or people with
the requisite expertise, distance, and commitment to undertake rigorous review and eliminate or alter conflicting or duplicative requirements when indicated.
Certain of these phenomena, particularly the failure to reconcile
the CJRA and the JIA, mean that the legislative and judicial branches
must cooperate more when formulating federal court policy and that
the condition of federal civil procedure is considerably worse than in
1988 when Congress found it unacceptable. Indeed, an important
irony of CJRA experimentation was that it has sensitized many members of the bench and bar to the need for consistent, simple procedures and has fostered their adoption or scrutiny of reforms, which
would reduce growing disuniformity and complexity.
III.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The first two Parts of this Article illustrated how prior developments in civil procedure, such as managerial judging, and rather
recent ones, namely the CJRA's implementation, encouraged the expansion of local strictures and that increasing numbers of these provisions conflicted with or repeated federal rules or statutes. The initial
Parts correspondingly showed that certain institutions and individuals
with responsibility for restricting the quantity, inconsistency, and redundancy of local measures were unable or reluctant to discharge
their duties and why proliferating requirements should be limited.
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Moreover, I recognized that numerous entities and people could decrease conflicting and duplicative local strictures in various ways, while
proliferation is only a single phenomenon, albeit symptomatic of
other important ones, which comprise the modern procedural
landscape.
Congress, the Judicial Conference, circuit judicial councils, appellate and district courts, and individual judges should undertake
concerted efforts to reduce local mechanisms' growing inconsistency
and redundancy, which have imposed the above disadvantages, particularly by further fragmenting the already fractured state of procedure
and increasing expense and delay. These implementing instrumentalities and persons must capitalize on the finest and abolish or ameliorate the worst features of the 1988JIA, the 1990 CJRA, and the federal
rules that implicate local proliferation, such as the local review prescriptions in certain 1985 and 1995 revisions as well as the local variation provisions in the 1993 civil rule amendments. 22 4 They can realize
those goals by restoring and maintaining the primacy of all the federal
rules that govern civil, appellate, bankruptcy, criminal, and admiralty
procedure and of the national revision process; by reattaining the procedural status quo which existed in 1988, principally through the expiration of the CJRA and of conflicting and repetitive measures adopted
thereunder; and by thoroughly effectuating the local review mandates
in the federal rules and the JIA.
A.

A Word About EmpiricalInformation

The maximum applicable empirical material must inform decisionmaking on the future of the CJRA, the JIA, and the federal rules,
as well as attempts to limit proliferation. The Judicial Conference, the
RAND Corporation, and the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) have collected, analyzed, and synthesized much empirical data on the requirements applied in pilot and demonstration courts, the other seventynine districts apparently have similar information on testing under
the 1990 statute, and the judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts possess, or have access to, additional
material on all ninety-four courts. In every appellate and district
court, numerous institutions and people involved with CJRA experimentation and with efforts to implement the provisions for local procedural review and amendment in the respective federal rules and the
224 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1625-32; see also supra notes 62-63, 98-106,
113-23 and accompanying text; infra note 242 and accompanying text. In fairness,
the 2000 revisions abolished some, but retained a few local option provisions. See
supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
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JIA have correspondingly gathered information or gleaned ideas that
could improve future policymaking.
Most important to local proliferation's reduction is systematically
assembling, evaluating, and synthesizing the greatest amount of relevant empirical data on the total quantity of local measures which actually exist, as well as the precise number that are inconsistent or
redundant and exactly how they conflict or are duplicative. For example, the preceding examination demonstrated the need to improve
comprehension of proliferation and to accumulate much greater, and
considerably more refined, information on local appellate, bankruptcy, criminal, and admiralty rules. There is concomitantly a striking dearth of material on strictures, namely individualjudge practices,
which are not local rules in all of the above areas and in civil procedure, primarily because many of these mechanisms are unwritten and
legal scholars and those responsible for monitoring the measures have
minimally scrtitinized them. It would also be helpful to have a clearer
understanding of the entities and persons officially charged with
adopting and reviewing local requirements and how they have fulfilled the duties imposed and have interacted.
A useful starting point might be the data on local strictures which
the Local Rules Project compiled and classified for potential inconsistency and redundancy, although this information may be somewhat
dated because courts and judges have applied, particularly under the
rubric of civil justice reform, numerous, additional conflicting and duplicative local procedures since 1989.225 The Administrative Office,
the FJC, and each of the appellate and district courts have, or could
collect, many local measures, and they might evaluate these measures,
especially techniques adopted under the CJRA. Several rather new
local procedural services, one of which is an electronic database, also
afford valuable access to a number of applicable local requirements. 2 26 Other helpful sources, principally of informative insights

for attempting to limit proliferation, are the local district reviews performed by the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Judicial Councils and by
27
some districts. 2
After those responsible for gathering and analyzing all of the relevant local mechanisms have completed this task, they ought to categorize the measures in terms of possible inconsistency and duplication.
225
226

See REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 49.
See, e.g., DIRECrORY OF FEDERAL COURT GUIDELINES (1996); FEDERAL LOCAL
COURT RULES, supra note 147; see also Westlaw, US-RULES database, http://
wiv.westlaw.com.
227 See supra notes 151-61, 173-76 and accompanying text; infra notes 244-47 and
accompanying text.
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Courts and judges adopting the procedures found in conflict or repetitive should be permitted to abolish or modify the strictures, and, if
they reject these opportunities, appropriate authorities, such as Congress, must eliminate or change the requirements.
B.

Suggestions Regarding the CJRA

Congress should conclusively decide the fate of the CJRA before
efforts to restrict proliferation are revived and comprehensively implemented because definitive resolution will facilitate those endeavors.
For instance, if Congress determines that the 1990 Act ought to expire, districts and judges should abrogate inconsistent or redundant
procedures, which they adopted under the legislation, thereby obviating the need to review a number of existing local measures and significantly simplifying the work.
Congress should thoroughly assess the maximum amount of pertinent information on the unprecedented CJRA experiment with
mechanisms for decreasing expense and delay in civil litigation. It
may seem somewhat premature, particularly before Congress has fully
absorbed the 1997 Judicial Conference report and recommendations
on the pilot project and report on the demonstration program and
much additional, relevant information on experimentation, to posit
very conclusive determinations about the efficacy of strictures that
judges applied. However, the Conference works, the expert, rigorous
evaluations which the RAND Corporation and the FJC recently finished, and the considerable material on the remaining courts suggest
that the statute should have expired in December 1997 when it was
apparently scheduled to sunset, although Congress has not conclusively prescribed expiration.228
228

See Carl Tobias, The Judicial Conference Report and the Conclusion of Federal Civil

Justice Reform, 175 F.R.D. 351, 360 (1998); see alsoJCR, supra note 71;JAMES

KAKALIK ET

AL., JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CwitL JUSTICE REFORM

Aar (1996);

DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO

THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT,

A STUDY

OF THE

FIVE

DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUS-

REFORM ACT OF 1990 (1997). Recent legislation arguably suggests expiration, but
it is too tense to be definitive. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L.
TICE

No. 106-518, 114 Stat. 2411, 2414. See generally Carl Tobias, Did the CivilJusticeReform
Act of 1990 Actually Expire, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 887 (1998). The Advisory Com-

mittee commissioned two follow up studies on discovery. SeeJames S. Kakalik et al.,
Discovery Management. FurtherAnalysis of the CivilJustice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39
B.C. L. Rev. 613 (1998); Thomas Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and
DisclosurePractice Under the 1993 FederalRule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 525 (1998).
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Those principles, guidelines and techniques, and other requirements which courts implemented under the CJRA that clearly saved
cost or time and which respected additional, important procedural
tenets, such as simplicity, and process Values should receive national
application through incorporation in the federal rules. 229 Devices,
the effectiveness of which remains uncertain, may warrant consideration in the ordinary process of federal rule revision. The measures
that displayed promise in reducing expense or delay but seemed insufficiently efficacious to deserve nationwide prescription because the
mechanisms conserved unclear amounts of money or time, or they
could threaten other procedural precepts might be identified for further selective testing. Congress should replace the CJRA's experimental methods with an approach which is premised on a 1991 proposed
amendment of Rule 83 that the revision entities apparently retracted
in deference to contemporaneous civil justice reform testing. This
recommended change would have permitted districts which secured
Judicial Conference approval to experiment with inconsistent local
230
rules for not more than five years.
Current information indicates that Congress should conclusively
provide for the 1990 Act's expiration, which means that districts and
judges must abolish strictures adopted under the CJRA which contravene or duplicate federal rules or United States Code provisions. It is
rather difficult to designate definitively those devices that warrant national adoption because all relevant data have yet to be evaluated and
synthesized systematically, and their analyses have not been completed. However, sufficiently conclusive determinations can be formulated by employing the Judicial Conference reports and suggestions,
the RAND and FJC assessments, and much material which is available
from other sources, such as the courts that experimented. Some measures in the general areas of case management, ADR, and discovery, as
well as a few mechanisms which were not among the eleven principles,
guidelines, and techniques that the CJRA specifically prescribed will
seemingly decrease cost or delay and honor significant procedural
tenets and process values.
229

SeeJudicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994); see also

Burbank, supra note 77, at 1466-71 (discussing process values).
230 See PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 111, at 152; Carl Tobias, A Modest Reform for
FederalProceduralRulemaking, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2001, at 283; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1630-32. Testing could also be premised on the approach used
with court-annexed arbitration. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994); see alsoAmendment
to the Judicial Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 1, 111 Stat. 1173 (1997). See
generally BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DisrPacr
COURTS (1990) (reporting findings of a study on court-annexed arbitration).
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More particular ideas can be offered. For example, differentiated case management apparently worked in the two demonstration
courts which extensively practiced it and in additional districts for
complicated and routine or ordinary litigation; however, numerous
judges concluded that the disadvafitages of categorizing suits into
tracks overrode the benefits.2 3 ' Invocation of various alternatives to
dispute resolution in a number of courts seemed to afford fiscal or
temporal savings, but more districts found that most ADR measures
minimally reduced expense or delay while imposing considerable
cost.232 Certain discovery techniques, such as the use of telephone

conference calls to resolve discovery disputes, also apparently saved

233
money or time.

Several difficulties that principally implicated automatic disclosure's effectuation complicate analysis of its efficacy. These include
the controversial nature of the federal revision adopted, erratic application by a number of districts which formally adopted the device, the
lack of evaluation accorded the mechanism, and the unclear determinations reached in the assessments performed. Anecdotal material
concomitantly indicates that the procedure's effectiveness is contextspecific.

234

Disclosure, thus, probably warrants refinement by confin-

ing its use to circumstances in which the technique appeared particularly efficacious or by authorizing continued experimentation in
233
courts that most successfully applied the device.
231

See, e.g.,

COURT FOR THE

DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES Disrar

W. DismICr

OF MICHIGAN, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT

37 (1995); U.S. Dis-

TRICT COURT FOR THE N. DISTRICT OF OHIO, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF CIL AND CRIMINAL DOCKET 1-3 (1993); see alsoJCR, supra note 71, at 90-93; STIENSTRA ET AL., supra

note 228, at 7-15, 29-132; Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 595.
232 See, e.g., JCR, supra note 71, at 99-102; STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 228, at
173-282; Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 585-86, 605-06; Memorandum from Kent

Snapp & Deborah Bell, to Judges in the Western District of Missouri (Oct. 22, 1996)
(on file with author). See generally EIjZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STEINSTRA, ADR
AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1996) (reporting the findings of a
study of several district courts). Congress did pass the Alternative Dispute Resolution

Act of 1998. See Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (1998).
233 See Counsel Connect Debates; CivilJustice Reform; Five Years Later, TEx. LAw., Feb.
24, 1997, at 28; Telephone Interview with D. Brock Homby, ChiefJudge, U.S. District
Court for the District of Maine (Jan. 29, 1997); see alsoJCR, supra note 71, at 81-85
(affording "alternative" program to expansion of CJRA measures); STIENSTRA ET AL.,
supra note 228, at 10-11.
234 See Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 605; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1615; see also
supranotes 94-106 and accompanying text.

235 These ideas are premised on testing to date andJCR. SeeJCR, supra note 71, at
97-98; DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
23-28 (1997) [hereinafter DISCLOSURE STUDY]; Cavanagh, supra note 79, at 594-95,
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It now appears that the Supreme Court or Congress should omit
all of the local option measures, which the Court, primarily out of
deference to ongoing CJRA experimentation, included in 1993
amendments to several discovery provisions and which the Court has
included in other rules. 23 6 The mechanism has imposed greater dis-

advantages, involving uniformity and simplicity as well as concomitant
expense and delay, than benefits in terms of increased flexibility for
testing discovery procedures calibrated to specific districts'
23 7
situations.
C. After the CJRA: Comprehensive Implementation of the Local Review
Requirements in the Federal Rules and the JIA
I have championed the reattainment of the 1988 procedural status quo and the systematic implementation of the prescriptions included in several federal rules and thieJIA. The provisions for limiting
local proliferation are obviously most relevant, although Congress and
the Supreme Court also intended to restore and maintain the primacy
of all the federal rules and the national revision process, to open the
federal rule amendment process, and to regularize and open local
procedural revision. Thorough effectuation of the elements covering
local review in the federal rules and the 1988 legislation, which implementation of the 1990 CJRA essentially discontinued, together with
the above-proposed resolution of CJRA experimentation, could substantially reduce the number of inconsistent and duplicative local
requirements.
Congress, the Court, and the Judicial Conference should clearly
reiterate the critical need for all entities and individuals with responsibility for proliferation to discharge these duties while affording them
another opportunity to fulfill the obligations. Congress could facilitate the short-term performance of those tasks and the periodic local
review envisioned in the federal rules and the JIA by providing the
requisite resources while definitively stating that the CJRA has expired
and that conflicting or redundant mechanisms adopted under the
statute must also expire.
604-05; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1615; see also Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 382-84 (2000) (revising Rule 26 to narrow disclosure's
scope).
236 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 106-10
(omitting some, but retaining a few local option provisions).
237 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text; see also DISCLOSURE STUDY,

supra note 235, at 3, 9, 42-43; JCR, supra note 71, at 98; infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (suggesting more limited use of local option measures in the federal
rules).

2002]

LOCAL FEDERAL CIVIL

PROCEDURE

1. General Ideas
The above examination of prior attempts at effectuating the responsibilities, which Congress and the Court imposed in the federal
rules and the 1988 JIA to restrict proliferation, suggests that they selected a method and implementing instrumentalities which realized
comparatively limited success and that there are preferable ways to
proceed. Indeed, the approach as well as the institutions and people
chosen were arguably so inadvisable or inefficacious that renewed effectuation would merely perpetuate a system which has proved
unworkable.
These ideas are not intended to denigrate the perceptive recognition by Congress and the Court of the troubling complications that
proliferation had created or their conscientious efforts to treat those
problems or of the endeavors of implementing entities and individuals in attempting to institute the regime prescribed. In fact, those responsible for review should have another opportunity to satisfy the
mandates in the federal rules and the 1988 JIA.
It is difficult to overstate the mammoth, complicated nature of
the duties assigned, particularly given the enormous number of local
procedures, a phenomenon which CJRA experimentation compounded, and the complexities entailed in clearly defining and felicitously applying the concepts of inconsistency and duplication.
Congress and the Court correspondingly imposed these substantial responsibilities on institutions and persons with few resources for completing myriad, onerous obligations, but Congress allocated no
funding to perform the new tasks. The CJRA also seemed to mandate
or at least authorize the application of conflicting and redundant local strictures so that many districts and judges could have felt obligated to prescribe, and numerous reviewers may have been unwilling
to evaluate, these measures. The 1990 Act, therefore, encouraged the
enforcement of violative requirements while essentially suspending
most efforts which might have limited proliferation.
Despite the above problems, it apparently remained much easier
to identify offending local provisions than to discharge the very delicate duty that the measures' designation triggered: the abrogation or
modification of strictures which appellate or district courts or judges
had adopted in the belief that the techniques would improve their
courts. Some instrumentalities and people responsible for scrutinizing and abolishing or changing those local procedures deemed inconsistent or duplicative were understandably reluctant to eliminate or
alter mechanisms prescribed for treating local conditions with which
the reviewers had relatively limited familiarity. For instance, appellate
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judges were probably loath to be perceived as infringing on district
courts' and judges' decisions that implicated local court administration. A few district judges may correspondingly have experienced intrinsic conflicts of interest because the jurists had promulgated, or
were contemplating the adoption of, similar requirements for their
courts.
Even the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's attempts to scrutinize
the local strictures of fifteen districts, efforts which were more ambitious than those of most councils, remained incomplete. 2 8 For example, the District Local Rules Review Committee and the Committee
for the Review of Local Bankruptcy Rules encountered comparatively
little difficulty in delineating many conflicting and redundant measures, and in persuading numerous districts and judges to abrogate or
change a significant number of these requirements. 23 9 However, both
entities specifically excluded CJRA mechanisms from review while deferring to some courts' and judges' determinations, particularly their
prescription of inconsistent and duplicative local procedures. 240
Moreover, when the two committees recommended that the judicial
council abolish or modify the strictures, which the committees considered conflicting or repetitive and which districts or judges did not
change, the council was unable or reluctant to eliminate or alter these
24 1
measures.
It bears reiteration that I am not criticizing Congress or the Supreme Court for the means, or the entities and individuals, chosen in
attempting to limit proliferation or those conducting review. Congress and the Court identified, and made good-faith efforts to address,
difficulties imposed by proliferating procedures, although neither
seemed to think completely through, or to appreciate conflicts between, the approaches that it employed. For instance, Congress did
not harmonize the 1990 statute's goal of encouraging experimentation with local expense and delay reduction measures and the objective in the federal rules and the 1988 legislation of restricting local
proliferation. Moreover, numerous developments, which were attributable to Congress or the Court, alone or synergistically discouraged
most institutions and persons from fulfilling their review obligations.
These included adoption of the CJRA and of certain 1993 federal
rules amendments, concomitant reluctance to abrogate or modify
procedures that appeared to be legislatively authorized, and failure to
238
239
240
241

See supra notes 152-61, 186-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 152-61, 186-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 152-61, 186-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 152-61, 186-91 and accompanying text.
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appropriate resources for local review. In short, the concepts examined above suggest that efforts to decrease proliferation should be
revitalized but that caution is warranted and the revived endeavors
must be rigorously evaluated.
- The little apparent. success attained thus far indicates the need to
scrutinize, or at least investigate, the method and implementing instrumentalities 'prescribed, particularly if a second attempt to satisfy
the local review mandates in the federal rules and the JIA yields minimal improvement. Should this assessment proceed and show that the
course of action used was inadvisable or misguided or that the entities
or people chosen to effectuate it were inappropriate, Congress or the
Court could then explore and select approaches and implementing
institutions or individuals offering greater promise. For example, the
delicate nature of abolition and change of conflicting and duplicative
local procedures may require that this task be assigned to someone
other than colleagues of the judges who adopt the strictures, although
this resolution might mean that Congress is the only viable choice.
2.

Specific Guidance
a.

Internal

i.

Local Procedural Adoption and Revision

When the appellate and district courts and individual judges,
alone or with local rules committees, contemplate promulgating new,
or amending current, local requirements, especially inconsistent or
redundant measures, they should exercise restraint and be sensitive to
the problems that attend the strictures' prescription and enforcement. These entities and people must only adopt additional, and retain present, conflicting, or duplicative local procedures, which are
necessary to treat peculiar, problematic local conditions or to facilitate the discovery of promising mechanisms. The institutions and persons should correspondingly abrogate or modify all local
requirements, particularly individualjudge practices, that contravene
or repeat federal rules or statutes; reduce to writing, and include in
local rules, the maximum number of local measures; and conform local rules to the uniform numbering system prescribed by the judicial
2 42
conference.
242 SeeTobias, supra note 15, at 1627; supra notes 115, 123 and accompanying text;
infra note 248 and accompanying text.
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Local Procedural Review

Insofar as appellate or district courts and judges had initiated efforts to limit local proliferation which the CJRA and other phenomena, such as resource deficiencies, effectively discontinued, they must
reassume, and implement comprehensively, the affirmative review obligations assigned, while those not instituting local procedural review
must now do so. 2 4 3 The appellate courts and district judges should
scrutinize all current local strictures for conflicts and redundancy and
eliminate or alter those found deficient. This examination will include requirements adopted under the aegis of the CJRA, if Congress
does not definitively provide for the 1990 statute to sunset or if courts
and judges retain the procedures after Congress permits the legislation to expire. Should the appellate and district courts and judges
conscientiously assess for inconsistency and duplication all local measures and abolish or change the strictures considered violative, these
activities could sharply restrict, and perhaps vitiate, the need for exogenous scrutiny.
b.
i.

External
Judicial Conference

If appellate courts, districts, or judges fail to capitalize on these
opportunities or conduct local procedural review that lacks sufficient
rigor, external entities may need to assume new or greater responsibilities for proliferation. For instance, the Judicial Conference, which is
to evaluate periodically local appellate requirements and abrogate or
alter those deemed conflicting or redundant, must fully discharge
these duties and might want to exercise less deference than it has to
appellate courts, which have minimally scrutinized their procedures.
The Conference should conduct an affirmative review by identifying
inconsistent and duplicative local measures, affording appellate courts
opportunities to correct deficiencies, and eliminating or changing the
strictures of those appellate courts which do not respond to its overtures. If the Conference is unable or reluctant to fulfill these obligations, Congress might encourage the Conference or even oversee
compliance.
243 Few councils apparently undertook rigorous review of local appellate strictures, even though the CJRA, which only implicates district court measures, had no

effect on this review.
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Circuit Councils

The circuit judicial councils have analogous responsibilities for
analyzing the districts' local requirements, most of which remain identical to the procedures that existed in 1988, as augmented by CJRA
mechanisms. Only a few circuit councils have satisfied the duties,
principally because the 1990 statute's effectuation essentially discontinued monitoring, or because Congress budgeted no resources for
review. Congress ought to appropriate adequate funding, while it
should clearly state that the CJRA has expired and require that conflicting and redundant measures adopted thereunder sunset.
The councils might correspondingly consult the models afforded
by the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Judicial Councils' examination of
their districts' local strictures, as these efforts show how to discharge
these responsibilities efficaciously and facilitate compliance with linited resources.2 44 The Seventh Circuit Council has depended on an
expert consultant, who served as Local Rules Project Director, to scrutinize and make recommendations annually on the procedures of the
districts within the court's purview, while the council has stringently
enforced the consultant's suggestions regarding inconsistency and duplication. 245 The Ninth Circuit Council concomitantly created a review committee under the auspices of its Chief Judges' Conference,
thereby enabling the council to secure considerable cooperation from
the districts. For example, the courts and individual judges apparently found many committee proposals for changing local requirements so palatable that they willingly implemented the
recommendations. 246 The committee also relied on volunteer law
professors and practicing attorneys to evaluate each district's local
measures which reduced the costs of compliance. 247 If the councils
that have inadequately discharged these obligations do not respond,
Congress or the Judicial Conference may wish to assume the duties.
iii.

National Rule Revision Entities

The national rule revision bodies, alone or in conjunction with
appellate and district courts and judges, might institute certain efforts
that could limit local procedural proliferation or ameliorate certain of
244 See Heiser, supra note 1, at 564-81; Tobias, supranote 166, at 983-94; see also
Tobias, supra note 152, at 359-69; supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
245 Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 151.
246 See supra notes 152-54, 158-60 and accompanying text.
247 See supranotes 155-57 and accompanying text; see also supranotes 187-91 and
accompanying text (analyzing the Ninth Circuit's review of local bankruptcy
measures).
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its detrimental consequences. For instance, the Judicial Conference
should promptly survey and enforce compliance with the April 1997
deadline for uniformly numbering local strictures in its directive implementing the 1995 amendments of the federal civil, appellate, bankruptcy, and criminal rules. 248 Virtually all of the regional circuits have
already conformed their local appellate rules to the FRAP. 249 Moreo-

ver, numerous districts have ordered the courts' local civil and criminal rules similarly to the federal analogues, 250 but some have not.
Non-com"Pliance may reflect mere inadvertence; resource deficiencies
or the concomitant belief that ofher matters, including daily dispute
resolution, deserve higher priority; or concern that consistency interferes with local prerogatives. Those appellate and district courts
which have not conformed their procedures should do so expeditiously because uniformity will reduce complexity, cost, and delay in
federal practice.
The Judicial Conference or the Federal Advisory Committees
might also thoroughly review, and seriously consider eliminating, any
remaining local option provisions in the respective federal rules for
which no compelling need exists. These prescriptions expressly authorize the appellate courts, districts, and judges to promulgate and
apply conflicting and redundant local requirements or recognize that
they might do so, phenomena which can complicate federal litigation
and can be expensive and time-consuming. Illustrative are varying
publication practices that a Judicial Conference resolution encouraged appellate courts to prescribe 251 and the local option
provisos governing discovery in the 1993 civil rule amendments. 252 Insofar as the Supreme Court has premised local option prescriptions
on the need to address problematic local conditions or to experiment
with promising measures, the withdrawn 1991 proposed revision in
253
Rule 83 could advance these goals and limit inconsistency.
248 See, e.g., FED. R. Clv. P. 83 (1995 amendment); see also supranotes 115, 123 and
accompanying text.
249

The Sixth Circuit is apparently the only court which has not.

250

Illustrative are the Districts of Colorado, Maryland, and Nebraska.

251 See, e.g., lST CIR. R. 36.2; 4TH CIR. R. 36; 6TH CIR. R. 24. FRAP 33 recognizes
that judges or officers might conduct settlement conferences. See, e.g., 8TH CIR. R.
33A; 9TH Cm. R. 33-1; 11TH CIR. R. 33-1 (c). In fairness, the Conference may have
been attempting to secure more uniformity or at least to insure that publication practices were in writing. See infra note 254.
252 See supra notes 98-109, 236-37 and accompanying text; see also supranotes 106,
110.
253 See supranote 230 and accompanying text; infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
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When special circumstances require the application of diverse
strictures in numerous appellate or district courts, however, the Court
should retain or adopt provisions for local variation.25 4 For instance,
FRAP 34's proviso that authorizes local variations in oral argument
may afford the requisite flexibility to address discrepancies in the size
and complexity of appellate court caseloads and resources for resolving appeals.2 55 The local option prescription iii Civil Rule 16 concomitantly seems to facilitate the practice of judicial case management,
which can differ significantly among districts, and to accommodate
the need for particularized, disparate treatment of complex and sim2 56
ple lawsuits.
c.

A Miscellany of Ideas

Should numerous circuit judicial councils, districts, and judges
fail to discharge their local review duties, even once the CJRA definitively expires and simplifies monitoring by substantially reducing the
number of local strictures that require analysis, the Judicial Conference or Congress might explore and implement other measures and
may want to examine approaches that are relatively intrusive or perhaps coercive. For example, a Conference committee or the FJC or
Administrative Office personnel could help specific courts and judges
complete review by offering additional expertise, information, or
resources.
In any event, the Conference or Congress should carefully evaluate the possibility of establishing a centralized instrumentality, such as
a standing committee on local procedures' which would facilitate nationwide effectuation of the mandates related to proliferation in the
federal rules and the JIA. 257 This entity could specifically serve as a

clearinghouse and might assist or complement the efforts of councils,
appellate and district courts, and judges by bringing expertise and independence, as well as a national perspective and oversight to these
endeavors. The institution could collect, assess, and synthesize all rel254 FRAP 34 at least clearly authorizes this practice, thus reducing the element of
surprise for non-local counsel and parties. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.

255 See, e.g., D.C. Cm. R. 34; 2D Cm. R. 34(d); 3D CIR. R. 34.1; see also Fed. R. App.
P. 34.
256 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; see also supra notes 110, 216 and accompanying text.
Congress and national and local rule revisors should attempt to limit proliferation by
considering procedural changes' effects on it and on phenomena, such as judicial
discretion, which facilitate proliferation. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1590 n.13 &

1627 n.237.
257 See Carl Tobias, Some Realism About FederalProceduralReform, 49 FLA. L. REv. 49,
79 (1997); see also Heiser, supra note 1, at 580-81.
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evant local strictures; encourage, and even be authorized to compel,
performance of the local review duties; and perhaps make suggestions
respecting abrogation or modification to the Conference or Congress,
if councils, courts, or judges do not cooperate. This instrumentality
must recognize that the tasks envisioned are delicate and work closely
with, and facilitate efforts of others, rather than be coercive.
All entities and individuals performing local procedural review
should keep in mind, and capitalize on, the experience of the Local
Rules Project which I recounted above. For instance, the Project has
assembled voluminous, valuable information on, and possesses great
expertise regarding, local measures and the institutions and people
responsible for their growth, and it can contribute significantly to realization of my recommendations for decreasing proliferation.2 58 The
Judicial Conference might even revitalize the Local Rules Project and
perhaps enlarge the entity's charter. The Project could compile, assess, and classify, in terms of consistency and redundancy, those local
procedures that courts and judges have applied since the 1989 completion of its report, while the Project's new work might encompass
strictures, such as individual-judge practices, which it did not include
in the study more than a decade ago.
D. Suggestions for TreatingProblematic Local Conditions and
for Experimenting
The analysis above indicates that the disadvantages which local
procedural proliferation imposes outweigh its benefits, but the evaluation also suggests that the expanding application of local provisions,
especially ones which are inconsistent or duplicative, serves several important purposes. Appellate courts, districts, and individual judges
adopted and enforced many of these requirements to treat peculiar,
problematic local conditions, such as expense and delay, which have
arisen from the litigation explosion and have received minimal attention in the federal rules, or to experiment with promising measures
that might warrant national implementation.
Congress or the Supreme Court, therefore, should accord courts
and judges the requisite flexibility to address unusual, difficult local
situations or to test nascent mechanisms by revising those federal civil,
appellate, bankruptcy, and criminal rules which govern the prescription of local strictures. 2 59 Congress or the Court could enable appellate courts, districts, and judges to treat the circumstances and to
258 See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
259 Congress is the-preferable entity to institute this change because the modification implicates questions of authority. See Levin, supra note 58, at 1585-87.
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experiment with a thorough, balanced approach, which might be
modeled on the 1991 proposed amendment in Civil Rule 83 that the
260
revisors withdrew out of respect for simultaneous CJRA testing.
The recommended change would have authorized districts which obtained Judicial Conference permission to experiment for five years
with local requirements that contravene federal rules or statutes.
One, or a percentage, of the appellate and district courts could promulgate and enforce techniques, which respond to troubling conditions, or might serve as laboratories for testing devices that appear
sufficiently effective to deserve employment in additional courts.
The 1991 suggested modification in Rule 83 included no criteria
on which the Conference would premise its decisions regarding proposals to apply local procedures that conflict with federal rules or the
United States Code provisions. 2 61 Congress or the Court could require appellate courts or districts to show that they need the measures
for treating problematic locl situations or even to present empirical
262
data indicating the strictures' potential efficacy.

The recent experience under the CJRA and the decade of experimentation which involved court-annexed arbitration could also inform future testing. 263 For instance, both efforts suggested- the need
for centralized monitoring and for a few courts to deploy similar provisions while gradually expanding experimentation with effective procedures. The appellate and district courts might consult their local
rules committees and develop proposals, and the Conference could
structure and coordinate testing. The experimentation that proceeds
must receive stringent evaluation. When testing and assessment show
the advisability of broader application, the Conference should ascertain whether additional experimentation or nationwide use is
indicated.
Numerous ideas support the adoption and effectuation of this
course of action. It capitalizes on the valuable model in the recommended revision of Rule 83, on entities with relevant expertise, and
on prior experience with the CJRA and court-annexed arbitration.
The approach provides sufficient flexibility to apply promising measures, which will address problematic local circumstances, and to conduct testing which will foster the discovery and employment of
strictures that revitalize and maintain the basic procedural tenets,
while minimizing the disruption of daily dispute resolution. Moreo260 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.

261

See PRELIMINARY

DRAFT,

supra note 111.

262 The courts might rely on prior federal or state court experimentation.
263 See supra note 230.
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ver, the above suggestions apart from the recommendations for treating difficult local situations and experimenting would afford those
responsible for the prescription, retention, and review of inconsistent
and redundant local requirements another opportunity to modify the
provisions as well as guidance for doing so.
This method of proceeding is also somewhat circumscribed. For
example, it treats local procedural proliferation more specifically than
other integral features of current federal litigation which have been
concomitants of proliferation. These central aspects include power's
accretion in district courts, increasing judicial discretion, and growing
emphasis on the pretrial process and on managerial judging. Those
phenomena's broad, structural, and ingrained nature and the obstacles, such as judicial opposition, to greater change indicate that more
fundamental reform should await the course of action's implementation. 26 4 The realization that the 1988JIA the 1985 and 1995 rule revi-

sions were the only important developments in modem civil process
which did not underlie the phenomena correspondingly attests to
their entrenched character, the difficulty in attaining additional
change, and the advisability of proceeding cautiously and of directly
attacking proliferation. 2 65 Some observers concomitantly consider
procedure's-present state so fragmented that it is best to secure a measure of stability with, for instance, a moratorium on reform before
pursuing broader change. 2 66 However, the comparatively narrow nature of the complications which local proliferation presents and of the
approach proffered indicate that it can be felicitously
2 67
implemented.
264 For example, the systemic character of judicial discretion, which permeates
modern disputing and the federal rules, means that it would resist broad change.
Managerial judging, which is primarily a style ofjudging, appears narrower and more
malleable but is difficult to address thoroughly because many judges practice it and
would oppose change. SeeJCR, supra note 71, at 74-75.
265 See Tobias, supranote 48, at 839; see also Cavanagh, supranote 79, at 601- 06. If
Congress or the judiciary directly addresses the phenomena, they must cooperate because this will be crucial to success and the work will implicate delicate interbranch
relationships typified by rule revision. See Mullenix, supra note 76, at 379-82,
399-400; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1623.
266 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 76, at 379-82, 399-400; Robel, supra note 86,
1449-50; see also Levin, supranote 86, at 900 (suggesting a preference for moratorium
or national procedural commission to conduct kind of intensive analysis and meticulous development of basic changes that may be indicated); Tobias, supra note 15, at
1627 & n. 228 (same); id. at 1612 & n. 168 (alluding to moratoria); Yeazell, supra note
60, at 676-78 (suggesting the need for painstaking development of changes).
267 For example, conflicting local rules are a rather discrete problem, whose treatment the CJRA has fostered by systematizing their adoption and emphasizing the difficulties posed. See Tobias, supra note 19, at 1422-27; Tobias, supra note 15, at
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This manner of proceeding may seem to impose a few disadvantages. For example, the course of action could limit experimentation
or the application of measures which address unusual, troubling local
conditions. Nonetheless, Rule 83's proposed revision, that would authorize testing with inconsistent, creative techniques for improving litigation, will minimize any potential loss of flexibility.2 68 Effectuating
the mandates which cover local proliferation in the federal civil, appellate, bankruptcy, and criminal rules and in the JIA might be expensive, and cost was apparently a major reason for the truncated
compliance witnessed.2 69 However, the expense entailed in halting
the growth of conflicting and redundant local requirements should be
comparatively small and could be reduced by employing volunteer assistance of the bar or law professors. 270 In short, these projected
problems, which are relatively minor or can be treated, seem less significant than the need to restrict inconsistent and repetitive local
0
provisions.
CONCLUSION

Local procedural proliferation has detrimentally affected modem
process. Increasing numbers of local strictures, many of which conflict with, or duplicate, federal rules or acts of Congress have created
confusion, imposed greater cost and delay in federal practice, andfurther balkanized federal procedure. If the institutions and individuals
responsible for the expansion of inconsistent and redundant local
measures implement the suggestions afforded in this Article, they
should be able to limit proliferation and improve process in the
twenty-first century.

1621-24. Proliferation is pervasive and difficult to treat fully because many judges
apply violative measures and will resist change.
268 See supranote 230 and accompanying text. Courts could also invoke their substantial inherent authority. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991). See

generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IowA L. REv. 735 (2001).
269 Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, supra note 148; Telephone Interview with Andrew Tietz, supra note 168; see also supra notes 168-72 and accompanying
text.
270 See supra notes 153-61, 230, 244-47 and accompanying text.
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